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Comparing Fault
DAVID C. SOBELSOHN*

INTRODUCTION

The rule that contributory negligence completely bars a plaintiff's recovery
for negligence arose in England in the early nineteenth century,' soon spread
to the United States, 2 and flowered throughout the common law world with
the growth of the industrial revolution. The development of exceptions, such
as the doctrine of the last clear chance, 3 helped to alleviate the harshness
of the rule overall, but did nothing to ameliorate its unfairness to the parties
4
in individual cases, since recovery was still had on an all-or-nothing basis.
A century after the birth of the contributory negligence rule, Congress
enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act, providing that contributory
negligence did not bar recovery but merely reduced it proportionately to the
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1. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
2. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (5th ed. 1984)

[hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
3. See Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
4. For a discussion of the injustice of the common law contributory negligence rule, see
G. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697
(1978).
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plaintiff's fault.5 Other federal statutes incorporating this principle soon
followed,6 as did state laws in Mississippi (1910) 7 and Wisconsin (1931)."

After England adopted comparative negligence in 1945, 9 comparative fault
swept the common law world, leaving the United States as the only common
law country generally adhering to the old contributory negligence rule. 0

Beginning in the late 1960's, possibly in reaction to criticism of the tort
system and calls for no-fault insurance," many American states adopted a

form of comparative negligence, usually by statute, 1 2 but occasionally by
judicial development of the common law of torts. 3 The conquest of America
by the principle of comparative fault is now an accomplished fact: fortyfour states have adopted the doctrine.1 4 Commentators who continue to

5. Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 53 (1982)).
6. E.g., Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified
at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)); Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, § 6, 41 Stat. 537, 537-38
(1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1982)).
7. Act of Apr. 16, 1910, ch. 135, 1910 Miss. LAWS 125 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §
11-7-15 (1972)).
8. Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 242, 1931 Wis. LAWS 375 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. §
895.045 (West 1983)).
9. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, ch. 28.
10. See generally Honor6, Causation and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 7, §7-147, at 96 (1972); Turk, ComparativeNegligence
on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189 (1950).
11. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 1.4, at 15, & 21.2, at 341 (1974); H.
WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:11, at 27 (1978).
12. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85
(West Supp. 1984); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983).
13. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). For a discussion of the legitimacy of
adoption of comparative fault by judicial decree, see Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative

v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21

VAND.

L. Rav. 889

(1968) [hereinafter cited as Comments on Maki v. Frelk].
14. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505
(Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1979); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp.
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132
(Supp. 1984); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140
Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913) (construing Ga. Code §§ 2781, 4426 (1910) (current version at GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-8-291, 51-11-7 (1982))); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-801 (1979); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 I11.2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-33-1
to 34-4-33-8 (Supp. 1984); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-258a (1983); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984); LA. Cry. CODE ANN. art.
2323 (Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 85 (West Supp. 1984); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); Gustafson
v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NaV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1984); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d
1234 (1981); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1984);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977);
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deride comparative fault as "an example of a short-sighted humanitarianism"'' 5
have come to resemble King Canute in their attempt to6 stem or roll back a
seemingly irreversible tide of decisions and legislation.'
Yet a workable system of comparative fault requires resolution of a host
of troubling issues, ignored by most of the states in the general rush to
12, § 1036 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1984);
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
As of this writing, states without comparative fault include Alabama, Maryland, North and
South Carolina, and Virginia. Of these, Alabama and Maryland have expressly rejected judicial
adoption of comparative fault. See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980);
Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983).
Although, in a recent opinion, the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
adoption of comparative fault, the South Carolina Supreme Court quashed the opinion on the
grounds that the supreme court had denied plaintiff permission to argue for the overruling of precedent. See Langley v. Boyter, 325 S.E.2d 550 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), opinion
quashed, 332 S.E.2d 100 (S.C. 1985). Finally, the supreme courts of North Carolina and
Virginia have not specifically considered the adoption of comparative fault. See Langley v.
Boyter, 325 S.E.2d at 558. But cf. Lawrence v. Wirth, 226 Va. 408, 309 S.E.2d 315 (1983)
(mitigation of damages), discussed in LeBel, Contributory Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Comparative Negligence Through the Back Door?, 10 VA. B.A.J., Fall 1984, at 11.
Tennessee is sometimes classified as a comparative negligence jurisdiction. H. WOODS, supra
note 11, at 559. Tennessee courts distinguish between negligent conduct by plaintiff that
proximately causes plaintiff's injury and plaintiff's "remote contributory negligence." Although
plaintiff's "proximate" negligence bars all recovery, her "remote" negligence results only in
a reduction of her recovery "in proportion to plaintiff's contribution to the injury." Arnold
v. Hayslett, 655 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tenn. 1983) (quoting Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576,
585 (Tenn. 1976)). The Tennessee Supreme Court distinguishes this approach from comparative
fault on the grounds that the Tennessee approach deals with "causation, rather than with a
comparison of the relative degrees of fault among the litigating parties." Arnold v. Hayslett,
655 S.W.2d at 946; see also id. at 945 n.4 (explaining difficulty, under Tennessee law, of
judicially implementing "an effective system of 'comparative negligence' "); Street v. Calvert,
541 S.W.2d at 585-86 (approving doctrine of "remote contributory negligence" while refusing
to consider adoption of "comparative negligence"). But many authorities limit "comparative
fault" to assessment of the extent of causation between the parties' negligence and plaintiff's
damages. See infra note 59. Once one accepts a focus on causation, a striking resemblance
emerges between Tennessee law and the law in Nebraska and South Dakota, both generally
considered to have systems of "comparative negligence," see, e.g., PROSSER & KEErON, supra
note 2, § 67, at 471 & n.26; H. WOODS, supra note 11, at 514, 555; Note, Comparative
Negligence, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1668 (1981); both states bar a negligent plaintiff's recovery
unless her fault is "slight," in which event plaintiff's recovery is reduced "in proportion to
the amount" of plaintiff's "contributory negligence." NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); S.D.
CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979). See generally Sobelsohn, "Pure" vs. "Modified" ComparativeFault: Notes on the Debate, 34 EMORY L.J. 65 (1985). Nevertheless, most observers agree
that "Tennessee is not a true comparative negligence jurisdiction." Stein, Appendix: State
Summaries, in 3 COMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE, at APP-1 17 (1984); accord, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2, at 471 & n.30 (listing Tennessee as one of the "remaining contributory negligence
states"). See generally Wade, Crawford & Ryder, ComparativeFault in Tennessee Tort Actions:
Past, Present and Future, 41 TENN. L. REv. 423 (1974).
15. R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 338 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
R. POSNER, TORT LAW]; see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.3, at 123-24 (2d ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; accord, e.g., Demsetz, When Does
the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 13, 27 (1972). See generally G. Schwartz,
supra note 4.
16. Of the 44 states with comparative fault, seven have adopted the doctrine since 1980.
These include Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, and Missouri. See supra
note 14.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
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adopt comparative fault.' 7 For example, although all American comparative
fault systems require apportionment of damages according to each party's
relative "percentage" of fault, 8 none indicates how a factfinder is to translate
a finding of negligence-traditionally an all-or-nothing determination19-into
numerical terms, 20 much less how to compare "fault" in cases brought under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur2' or a theory of strict liability. 22 Lawmakers
in jurisdictions with comparative fault must also decide the reach of the
principle's application-for example, whether to apply it at all in strict24
liability cases 23 or when plaintiff has suffered some non-"physical" injury.
Finally, adopting comparative fault requires determining whose fault is to
25
be compared-an issue whose resolution may prove particularly vexing.
Although a state need not resolve such issues immediately upon adopting
comparative fault, 26 ultimately any comparative fault jurisdiction must consider the "how," "when," and "whose" of "comparing fault."
17. Dean Wade has called American comparative fault statutes "hastily and inartistically
drafted," Wade, A Uniform ComparativeFault Act-What Should It Provide?, 10 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 220, 221 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wade, What Should It Provide?], and has
accused the drafters of these statutes of avoiding "many of the most difficult problems" raised
by the adoption of comparative fault. Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379,
380-81 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Uniform Act].
On the various issues raised by comparative fault see generally C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT,
COmPARATIVE NEGUGENCE MANUAL (J. Palmer & S. Flanagan rev. ed. 1985); V. ScHWARz,

supra note 11; H. WOODS, supra note 11; Fleming, The Supreme Court of California, 197475-Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Fleming, Foreword]; Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of
the CaliforniaLegislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30

HASTINGS

L.J. 1465 (1979) [hereinafter cited as

Fleming, Report]; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Note, supra
note 14.

18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b)(2) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE §
34-4-33-5 (Supp. 1984); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984) (quoting UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1984)). See generally H. WOODS, supra note II, §§

20:2 & 20:3.
19. See Comment, Mathematics, Fuzzy Negligence, and the Logic of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
75 Nw. U.L. REv. 147, 153-54 (1980). See generally Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed
Compromises-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 750 (1964) (criticizing
"winner-take-all" approach to legal conflicts generally).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

27-89.
90-96.
97-155.
160-97.
214-38.
239-357.

26. A rare judicial attempt to resolve all the issues surrounding comparative fault before
implementing the doctrine is Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983), in which the
court, upon adopting comparative fault, deemed it necessary immediately to decide "the simplest
and most clear, concise, and direct method for adopting a comprehensive system of comparative

fault." Id. at 15. The court then announced: "Insofar as possible this and future cases shall
apply . . . the Uniform Comparative Fault Act," id. at 15-16, a copy of which the court
appended to its opinion. See id. at 17-27. On the background of the Gustafson decision, see
Anderson & Bruce, Recent Developments in Missouri Tort Law: Gustafson v. Benda, 52
UMKC L. REv. 538 (1984). See also Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Ky. 1984) (Leibson,
J., concurring in court's adoption of comparative fault and urging that "[tihe Missouri approach
is well suited to our problems in the present case and the needs of our system").
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I.
A.

How
Negligence

1. In General
As Dean Prosser once pointed out, because a system of "comparative
fault" changes tort law primarily in allowing a negligent plaintiff some
measure of recovery, one might more appropriately term a comparative fault
law a "damage apportionment" statute. 27 But adoption of such a statute
2
does not automatically suggest any particular method of apportionment.
Indeed, common law courts cited the difficulty of deriving a fair apportionment as their justification for refusing to compare fault in cases in which
plaintiff had been contributorily negligent. 29 Even some recent observers,
while generally approving the modern trend away from the contributory
negligence rule, have argued that, with regard to allocation of fault, "no
rational or objective legal standard or definition is possible." 0 This conclusion has led to proposals that, in cases of contributory negligence, the court
divide damages evenly among the parties3 or reduce plaintiff's recovery by
"a uniform index factor, such as 30, 50 or 70 percent. '32 In fact, until very
recently, an even-division rule prevailed in admiralty cases. 33 Such a rule
27. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 438 n.97 (4th ed. 1971); accord,
e.g., Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 499 (Me. 1973).
28. Cf. Prosser, supra note 17, at 465 n.2 (rule might even allow for full recovery).
29. See, e.g., Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862) (arguing "the law cannot measure
how much the damages suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's own fault").
30. Aiken, ProportioningComparativeNegligence-Problemsof Theory and Special Verdict
Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 293, 295 (1970) (emphasis omitted); accord Epstein, Plaintiff's
Conduct in Products Liability Actions: ComparativeNegligence, Automatic Division and Multiple Parties,45 J. Ant L. & CoM. 87, 109 (1979) (claiming that "[a]ll allocation of responsibility
between the two parties [to a tort action] is arbitrary"). In his classic work on comparative
fault and contribution among tortfeasors, Glanville Williams found himself forced to admit
that "in attempting to assess degrees of negligence the judge is trying to measure the immeasurable ....
[We should recognize that the action is arbitrary ... [and] does not in itself
involve any question of fact ....
G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

§ 44, at 158 (1951). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 55-58 (suggesting method for
connecting percentages of fault to evidence in case).
31. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 30, at 111.
32. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 749, 575 P.2d 1162, 1176, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 394 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring); see Epstein, supra note 30, at 110 (asserting need
for "a fixed judicial or legislative rule" to promote "certainty and predictability").
33. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Fleming, Foreword,
supra note 17, at 248. Some commentators classify the "even division" rule as an alternative
to what are known as the "pure" and the "modified" approaches to comparative fault. See,
e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 32; Wade, Uniform Act, supra note 17, at 38485. See generally Sobelsohn, supra note 14. This is misleading. The choice between "pure"
and "modified" comparative fault concerns the circumstances under which plaintiff ought to
recover anything. See id. By contrast, the "even division" rule concerns the precise proportion
of his or her damages plaintiff ought to recover. Nothing would prevent a state, for example,
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does have the advantage of easy administration. 34 But it is so patently
arbitrary 35 and unfair, 36 and places such enormous importance on the number
37
of parties involved in the accident (or, even worse, joined to the lawsuit),
38
that today not a single state follows an even-division rule.
Instead, every state requires the factfinder to determine each party's "percentage of fault"3 9 and to award damages in accordance with these percentages. 40 Devising a formula for determining fault "percentages" is no
easy task. 4' But virtually every comparative fault law in the United States
assumes that a jury can simply divide up fault "as if it were a tangible and
measurable commodity.' '42
The difficulty in devising an apportionment formula rests principally in
the apparent requirement that any such formula provide an intelligible basis
for "comparing" the culpability of two or more different actors. The be43
havior of negligent parties often seems incommensurable.
Judicial opinions and academic commentary have suggested various means
of resolving this difficulty. Perhaps the most helpful suggestion is that the
factfinder conceive of the parties' conduct as lying on a scale from 0 to 10,
with reasonable conduct at 0 and intentional misconduct at 10."4 By providing
a way to state the culpability of each party in numerical terms, this approach-which one might call the "fault-line ' 45 or "benchmark" 46 approach-at least provides an intelligible basis for comparing fault in terms
of percentages.

47

from allowing recovery only to plaintiffs less than 50/01 at fault, and in addition limiting the
recovery of negligent plaintiffs to 50% or some other fixed percentage of their damages. See
Prosser, supra note 17, at 465 n.2 (rejection of contributory negligence rule does not require
any particular approach to apportionment of damages).
34. Fleming, Foreword, supra note 17, at 248-49.

35. Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals in Washington-A Public Policy Analysis,
4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 143, 159 (1980); see United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397, 404 (1975).
36. Fleming, Foreword, supra note 17, at 248-49.
37. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 113 (claiming "the only possible rule is one that uniformly
divides the loss by the number of responsible parties to the case").
38. Wade, Uniform Act, supra note 17, at 384.
39. See supra sources cited notes 14 & 18.

40. See id.
41. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 111 (calling apportionment of fault a "fruitless pursuit
for illusory percentages").
42. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 17.1, at 276.
43. Epstein, supra note 30, at 109. Application of comparative fault principles to strict
liability only aggravates the difficulty. Id.; accordTwerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative
Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797, 806 (1977); see infra text accompanying
notes 97-155 & 160-97.

44. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of
the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1980); see Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 500
(Me. 1973); cf. Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624, 633-35 (1982) (applying
approach to products liability).
45. See Pearson, supra note 44, at 349.
46. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624, 633-34 (1982).
47. But see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 98, at 390 (question of comparative fault "cannot
be determined by mathematics"); Aiken, supra note 30, at 300 (arguing that "spelling out the
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Nevertheless, without modification, the fault-line approach has serious
inadequacies. First, the approach includes no formulae for deriving the
numbers reflecting each party's percentage of fault. The only hint of a
standard is the suggestion that the key variable is each party's state of
mind. 48 That suggestion itself constitutes a second serious flaw: it is simply
untrue that state of mind is the only variable in determining fault. Although
a mass murderer and a practical joker may each consciously intend harmful
or offensive contact with his victim, surely no one would for that reason
consider the two equally "blameworthy," at least in any moral sense.
The essential problem with the fault-line approach is its focus on only
one of the traditional elements in the concept of "fault. '49 Judge Learned
Hand defined negligence as the failure to take cost-justified precautions. 50
Under the Hand formulation, a party acts unreasonably when the overall
risk of not taking a particular precaution (the product of the likelihood of
an injury, "P," times the probable extent of the loss, "L"), outweighs the
savings in not taking that precaution ("B").5 1It seems logical to use precisely
the same factors to compare fault that determine whether a party was at
fault in the first place. 2 If "fault" means "a departure from a standard of
conduct required of a person by society for the protection of his neighbors," 53
"comparing fault" ought to mean a comparison of the extent to which each
party deviated from the applicable standard of conduct. One can accurately
fix the extent of the deviation only by considering all the factors that go
into formulating the applicable legal standard.
With this modification-and abandonment of the artificial limit of the
number ten-the fault-line approach becomes a workable method of comparing fault, at least in negligence actions;5 4 one can now translate, into
numerical terms, the extent of a party's deviation from a standard of "reamathematics" will "inevitably contradict and confuse juries, ourselves, and everyone else").
See also Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1376 (1971) (use of mathematics in litigation may lead to "erosion of the public's
sense that the law's fact-finding apparatus is functioning in a somewhat comprehensible way").
48. See Pearson, supra note 44, at 349 (fault line consists of "absence of fault at one end"
and "deliberate wrongdoing at the other").
49. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 31, at 169-70. For additional problems
with the "fault line" approach in the context of products liability cases, see infra text accompanying notes 126-42.
50. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see Brown,
Towards An Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 333-35 (1973); Grady, A
New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 815 (1983); Posner, The
Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 198
(1981).
51. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see R. POSNER,
EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 15, § 6.2, at 122.
52. V. ScHwARTz, supra note 11, § 17.1, at 278; Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability
of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV. 431, 434 (1978); see Associated Eng'rs, Inc.
v. Job, 370 F.2d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying South Dakota law).
53. See PROSSER & KEEroN, supra note 2, § 75, at 535; accord J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
TORTS 256 (5th ed. 1977).
54. For application of the fault-line approach, as thus modified, to strict liability cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-25 & 143-55.

[Vol. 60:413
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sonable care." If "P x L" is the overall risk of not taking a particular
precaution,15 and "B" is the cost of taking that precaution, then, as P x L
becomes greater relative to B, the actor is more and more negligent.5 6 The
number representing each party's negligence is simply the quotient of P x
L for that party, divided by B-what one might call each party's "fault
quotient."
To compare each party's deviation requires only two additional steps.
First, one must total the fault quotients of all the parties; s? this produces
the sum of all the parties' deviations-the total fault in the case. Then, to
ascertain any given party's fault percentage, one simply divides the number
representing that party's fault quotient by the total fault figure.' 8
For example, suppose plaintiff, on the way to an important meeting,
drove across defendant's railroad tracks without slowing down or looking
to see whether a train was coming. Assume that the overall risk of injury

was $60 (the probability of injury multiplied by the likely seriousness of the
injury), and the cost of plaintiff's slowing down was $15 (the risk of being
late to the meeting). Since the risk of injury exceeded the cost of avoiding
the injury, plaintiff was negligent. But assume that defendant was also
negligent, in not having a whistle on its train. The overall accident risk
without a whistle was $40; the whistle would cost $20. Plaintiff's fault

quotient is 60/15, or 4; defendant's is 40/20, or 2. To determine the total

55. In computing the overall risk of particular behavior-by either party-the factfinder
should take into account not only the risk of harm to the other party to the lawsuit, but rather
the risk that behavior poses to all foreseeable victims. See Thode, Some Thoughts on the Use
of Comparisons in Products Liability Cases, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 3, 9.
56. If P x L is smaller than B for any party, that party has acted reasonably; the expected
accident rate was simply not worth the cost of prevention. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence,
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
57. In jurisdictions that require the factfinder to consider the fault of nonparties, this total
will include the fault quotients of all persons contributing to the accident. For a discussion of
the inclusion of nonparties in the fault comparison, see infra text accompanying notes 241-319.
58. Algebraically (assuming a case with only two parties, "A" and "B"), this equation is:
P.

x L

PERCENTAGE FAULT OF PARTY A =BA
P. x L.
BA

+

P. x L.
B"

For cases with more than two parties, one should simply add additional fractions to the
denominator.
Judge Posner suggests that the factfinder should "compare the ratio of each party's optimal
expenditure on care to the expected accident cost" of taking no precautions. R. POSNER, TORT
LAW, supra note 15, at 337. This cannot be correct, for both sides of Judge Posner's equation
ignore the actual conduct of the parties to the case, who may have in fact taken some precautions
that left only an amount less than "optimal expenditure" required to constitute "reasonable
care."
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fault, add the parties' fault quotients: 4 plus 2 equals 6. Finally, to determine
each party's percentage of fault, simply divide that party's fault quotient
by 6. Thus, plaintiff's relative fault is 4/6, or about 67%; defendant's is
2/6, or about 33%.

A factfinder applying this approach should consider the culpability of
each party's conduct, as well as the extent of the causal relation between

that conduct and the accident.59 Prime factors in considering the culpability
of conduct are the magnitude of the risk created by that conduct and the

burden required to avoid that risk-P x L and B in the Learned Hand
formula. 60 The fault-quotient approach also accommodates more subjective
factors, such as the existence of an emergency 6' or a party's capacity 62 or
59. Many authorities consider the comparison of causation to be the best approach to the
apportionment of fault. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir.
1979); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 116, 454 N.E.2d 197, 203 (1983); Davies
v. Swan Motor Co., [1949] 2 K.B. 291, 326 (Denning, L.J.); Twerski, From Defect to Cause
to Comparative Fault-RethinkingSome Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297,
326 (1977). See generally Honor6, supra note 10, ch. 7, § 7-175, at 121-22. Dean Prosser,
among others, vigorously disputed this approach, insisting that, after proof of actual and
proximate cause, the issue of causation should drop out of the case and the finder of fact
should assess only the relative culpability of the parties' conduct. See Prosser, supra note 17,
at 481; accord, e.g., Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1980) (admiralty law);
State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775, 782 (Alaska 1977); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 130-31,
570 P.2d 138, 142 (1977); see also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 44, at 157 (doubting that
apportionment on the basis of causation is even "logically possible"); Wilkins, The Indiana
Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance, 17 IND. L. REv. 687, 695 (1984) (arguing
that the extent of a party's causation of an accident has no necessary relation to the extent of
that party's "fault"). Some authorities would require the factfinder to consider both conduct
as well'as causation in apportioning fault. See, e.g., Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 21516, 108 N.W.2d 581, 583-84 (1961); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.015 (Supp. 1985); MODEL UNIF.
PROD. LIAB. ACT § lll(B)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,735 (Dep't of Com. 1979); UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985); James, Connecticut's Comparative Negligence
Statute: An Analysis of Some Problems, 6 CONN. L. REv. 207, 217 (1974).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
61. Courts have traditionally instructed the jury that "a person . . . suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril ... is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and
prudence that is required ... in calmer and more deliberate moments." Leo v. Dunham, 41
Cal. 2d 712, 714, 264 P.2d 1, 2 (1953); accord, e.g., Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285, 292,
434 N.E.2d 231, 235, 449 N.Y.S.2d 162, 166 (1982); see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2,
§ 33, at 196-97.
62. Within limits, a party's capacity has also traditionally affected the extent of his or her
legal responsibility. See, e.g., Argo v. Goodstein, 438 Pa. 468, 265 A.2d 783 (1970) (blind
person held to standard of one with that physical disability); Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d
869 (Iowa 1982) (holding children to standard of child with like "age, intelligence, and experience"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 comment d, at 69 (1965) (actor held to use
"those superior qualities and facilities which he himself has"). But see Vaughan v. Menlove,
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837) (level of intelligence irrelevant to legal responsibility). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 32; Wertheimer, Comparative Negligence and Persons
Under a Disability, in 2 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 10.00-10.50 (1984).
The factfinder, in a case of comparative fault, should imit consideration of the parties' capacities to the traditional categories. This follows from the assumption that the objective "reasonable
person" standard of tort law rests primarily on the administrative difficulty of applying a
different standard to every tortfeasor and accident victim. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 16.2, at 903 (1956). This administrative difficulty is no less-indeed, it is
greatly increased-in a system of comparative fault, where the issues for the factfinder are
already complicated by the need to compare fault.
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awareness of the risk.6 The cost to a person, faced with a sudden emergency,
of choosing an accident-avoiding path quickly enough far exceeds the cost
("B") to one with time to deliberate about various alternative safety measures. Similarly, an actor with "inferior" capacity to avoid harm must expend
more effort to avoid a danger than need a person with "superior" ability.6
Finally, a person about to cause injury inadvertently must expend much
more effort to avoid the danger than need one who is at least aware of the
danger involved.
In theory, the fault-quotient approach could include consideration of both
actual and proximate causation.6 5 A comparison of actual causation would
require considering "the likelihood, at a percentage basis," that a given
party's conduct caused plaintiff's injury. 6 The factfinder would use such a
percentage to discount each party's initial fault quotient67 prior to determining
that party's fault percentage. For example, if the jury initially fixes plaintiff's
fault quotient at 6 and finds only a 50% probability that plaintiff's misconduct caused her injury, the jury would reduce plaintiff's fault quotient
to 3.61
But comparing cause-in-fact presents several problems. First, in very few
cases will comparing actual causation help allocate fault; actual cause is
seldom a significant issue. 6 9 More broadly, the task of comparing the culpability of the parties' conduct will probably tax the capacity of the ordinary
jury to its limits; an additional layer of complexity requires substantial
justification. Finally, juries ultimately base virtually all their decisions on
probabilities.70 It is unclear why a comparative fault system should single
63. Courts have traditionally cited "awareness of the danger" as a factor distinguishing
mere negligence from the higher state of culpability commonly known as "recklessness" or
"willful and wanton conduct." See, e.g., Ellis v. Ferguson, 238 Ark, 776, 779, 385 S.W.2d
154, 155 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SEcorD) OF TORTS § 500 comment g, at 590 (1965). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 34, at 212-14.
64. See R. POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 15, at 230-31.
65. On the relation between actual and proximate causation, see Borgo, Causal Paradigms
in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts:
An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975). See also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2, § 41, at 263-64.
66. Twerski, supra note 43, at 828 (emphasis deleted); see Jensvold, A Modern Approach
to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 742
(1974); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of
Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 413-14 (1978). For arguments that juries, as
a general matter, should explicitly consider probabilities in assessing damages, see Coons, supra
note 19, at 757; Finkelstein & Farley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Comment, supra note 19, at 156, 163-65; Note, Towards Principles
of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1045-46 (1974).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
68. Cf. Twerski, supra note 43, at 826-29 (discussing Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389
N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976)). A similar approach is evident in some of the "DES" cases, such as
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (absent specific
proof of causation, manufacturer held liable for proportionate share of market), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980). See Coons, supra note 19, at 753; Comment, supra note 19, at 155 n.49.
See generally Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68
VA. L. Rav. 713 (1982).
69. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624, 633 (1982).
70. See Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 23; Cullison, ProbabilityAnalysis of JudicialFact-Finding:A Preliminary Outline of the
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out the issue of actual causation for special treatment, yet the typical jury
could not handle instructions requiring discounting of fault quotients according to the probabilities as to every evidentiary issue in the case. 7'
One can somewhat more easily support inclusion of a concept of proximate
cause in the fault comparison.7 2 Courts articulate at least two different tests
of "proximate cause." The "direct causation" test, often associated with
&3
the English case In re Polemis
and with Judge Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf
7 4
v. Long Island Railroad, requires only that the conduct be a "direct" cause
of the harm. The test turns on the presence or absence of significant intervening causes.7 5 By contrast, under the "foreseeability" test, sometimes
identified with the English case The Wagon Mound 76 and with Judge Cardozo's majority opinion in Palsgraf,nplaintiff can recover only when defend7
ant could have foreseen the "type" of harm caused. 1
The fault-quotient approach to comparing fault could accommodate the
Wagon Mound version of proximate cause: the factfinder would simply
determine the likelihood, from the actor's point of view, that, assuming an
accident would occur, that accident would be of the same general "type"
as the accident that did occur. 79 The probability thus derived, expressed in
percentage terms, would then be used to discount the actor's fault quotient
in much the same way as might the probability of actual causation. 0 But
this approach raises some of the same problems raised by comparing actual
causation, 8' particularly the danger of excess jury confusion. It is far from

Subjective Approach, 1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 538; Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal
Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158, 168 (1958); Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1456, 1456 (1977). See generally I. GOOD, PROBABILITY AND
THE WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE 62 (1950).
71. See Kalven, supra note 70, at 168 ("the law ... can hardly write a formula that would
accommodate ... the ambiguities in the basic evidence itself"); Tribe, supra note 47, at 135878. But see Comment, supra note 19, at 157 n.62, 160-61 (claiming jury in fact does reduce
recovery according to empirical probabilities despite absence of instructions to do so); cf. Burr
v. State, 466 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1985) (improper for sentencing jury in capital case to consider
residual doubt concerning defendant's guilt), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 201 (1985).
72. See, e.g., Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281, 287 (7th Cir. 1980); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977); Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 21516, 108 N.W.2d 581, 583-84 (1961); MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § Il1l(B)(3), 44 Fed. Reg.
62,735 (Dep't of Com. 1979) (requiring comparison of both conduct "and the extent of the
proximate causal relation between [that] conduct and the damages claimed").
73. In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., [19211 3 K.B. 560, 1921
All E.R. 40.
74. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 356, 162 N.E. 99, 104-05 (1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting).
75. See Martinez v. Lazaroff, 48 N.Y.2d 819, 820, 399 N.E.2d 1148, 1148, 424 N.Y.S.2d
126, 127 (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 43, at 293-94.
76. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961 A.C. 388.
77. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 346-47, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 comment e (1965); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2, § 43, at 283-84.
79. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 17.1, at 278.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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clear what benefits would flow from comparing this type of proximate cause
to justify the costs of making the comparison.
Comparing "direct" causation is more difficult and, at first blush, may
appear even less justifiable. One might compare the number of intervening
causes, but this seems arbitrary and irrelevant to any understandable notion
of "culpability." 8 2 Moreover, focusing on the "directness" of the link between a party's conduct and the accident would bias the law against certain
classes of plaintiffs, such as consumers in products liability cases, whose
negligence is always closer to the injury (and thus always a more "direct"
cause of the injury) than is the wrong of defendant.83 In addition, at least
one commentator has questioned the feasibility of intelligibly measuring and
comparing the "directness" of a causal link so as to come up with percentages
4
of fault.1
Once one translates direct causation into probabilities, however, 5 one can
sensibly assess the "directness" of a causal link in apportioning fault under
the fault-quotient approach.8 6 The less direct a cause is, "the more surely
do other causes intervene to affect the result." 8 7 Those other causes pose
not only the risk of aggravating an injury, but also the hope of ameliorating
or even avoiding it. Consequently, as a general matter, as causal conduct
becomes more remote from an accident, the less that conduct-in retrospect-seems to have increased the risk of that particular accident.
This is not always so. A manufacturer designing, producing, and selling
a defective product surely has done more to increase the risk to a user of
that product than has the retailer who simply receives, stores, and sells the
product-perhaps even in a sealed container. Indeed, this example illustrates
the danger in treating comparative direct causation as a concept apart from
risk. At least in terms of the number of intervening factors, the retailer's
conduct has a more "direct" effect on plaintiff's injury than does the conduct
of the manufacturer, yet no one would contend the factfinder should allocate
more of the fault to the retailer for that reason.
With the translation of proximate cause into a matter of risk, comparing
the causal relation between a party's conduct and the accident becomes
intelligible and justifiable. The court should instruct the jury to consider
causation, but only as it affects their assessment of the dangerousness of
8
each party's risk-producing behavior.
82. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 446-47.
83. See Epstein, supra note 30, at I11.
84. Fischer, supra note 52, at 446.
85. Cf. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IowA L. REv. 363, 41534 (1984) (analyzing direct causation as device for minimizing probable social cost).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58. See also G. WLLIAMS, supra note 30, § 44,
at 157 (calling proximate cause "only another expression for legal blame").
87. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting).
88. One might wonder, if "culpability of conduct" and "extent of causal relation" both
serve only as proxies for "risk of injury" and "burden to avoid harm," why the factfinder
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Limiting the factors in comparing fault to the burden of avoiding an
accident and the risk of not taking particular precautions, by allowing
comparison of two reasonably commensurable criteria, helps greatly in deriving percentages of fault. With this approach, the jury can base its verdict
less on speculation and more on "the particular pattern of factual
information"8 9 introduced as evidence in the case.
2.

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur poses a unique problem for comparative fault. By
definition, in a res ipsa loquitur case the negligent party's conduct is unknown; the accident itself provides the necessary inference of negligence. 90
Moreover, because one does not know precisely what caused the accident,
one cannot tell exactly what precautions would have prevented it. Knowing
neither what caused the accident nor what could have prevented it seems to
make it impossible either to assess the culpability of the negligent party's
conduct or to compare the risk of the accident with the burden of taking
the precautions necessary to avoid it.
One can solve this dilemma in a number of ways. For example, the jury
could assess only the fault of parties found negligent without the use of res
ipsa loquitur, essentially ignoring the fault of the party found negligent only
by using res ipsa loquitur. 91 But this approach assumes a case with only two
parties; applying the approach when there are several parties-only some of
whom are found negligent under res ipsa loquitur-would present great
difficulty. Moreover, not all circumstantial evidence suggests negligence of
the same degree; one set of facts may indicate negligence far more serious
than that indicated by another set of facts. Surely the jury should have the
tools to distinguish the culpability of the parties in such cases.
Those tools become available once one translates a finding of res ipsa
loquitur into terms of risk and burden. A key element of a res ipsa loquitur
finding is the conclusion that, ordinarily, accidents of the type that occurred
do not happen without negligence. 92 To reach this conclusion, the jury may
need expert testimony, 93 describing, for example, precautions generally taken
should consider either culpability or causation, instead of focusing on risks and burdens as
such. The answer is that both culpability and direct causation aid in understanding the magnitude
of the risk of dangerous conduct, as well as the cost of avoiding that risk. The factfinder thus
considers culpability and direct causation as a way of more precisely ascertaining the actual
level of unnecessary risk posed by the parties' conduct.
89. Epstein, supra note 30, at 109.
90. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 540 P.2d 33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975);
Mayes v. Kansas City Power & Light, 121 Kan. 648, 249 P. 599 (1926). See generally PROSSER
& KETON, supra note 2, § 39.
91. Cf. Fischer, supra note 52, at 446-47 (proposing similar approach to use of comparative
fault in strict liability cases).
92. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 39, at 244. See generally Kaye, supra note 70;
Comment, supra note 17.
93. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 435 A.2d 1150 (1981).
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to avoid the kind of accident that occurred.94 From this evidence-or, in

many cases, from the jurors' own experience-the jury can roughly estimate
the average cost of avoiding this kind of accident. A finding of negligence
based on res ipsa loquitur represents, in essence, the conclusion that the risk
of such an accident ordinarily outweighs the cost of avoiding it. One can
describe the relationship between these two variables in precisely the same

way one can describe their relationship when one knows exactly what happened. The only difference is that, instead of variables derived from the
exact circumstances of the accident that occurred, the variables come from
generalized findings concerning the type of activity that led to the accident.

So, for example, when a car swerves off the road for no apparent reason, 95
the jury can compare the average cost to drivers of avoiding sudden swerves,
to the overall risk of injury (taking into account both the probability and
likely seriousness of the injury) from a sudden swerve. The jury can then
compare the resulting fault quotient to the fault quotient for the other parties
96
in the case in order to derive the parties' respective percentages of fault.

B.

Strict Liability

Strict liability cases present the most difficult problem for a system of
comparative fault. 97 One commentator, perhaps resignedly, has declared that,
in order to derive fault percentages in a strict liability case, "one must simply
close one's eyes and accomplish the task." 98
But surely the requirement that justice be blind does not mandate that

cases be decided in the dark. If coming up with a rational approach to
comparing "fault" in the strict liability context proves so difficult that juries

94. See, e.g., McCray v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 89 Tex. 168, 34 S.W. 95 (1896) (expert
testimony that, if properly loaded, steel bar would not have fallen on plaintiff).
95. See, e.g., Winter v. Scherman, 57 Hawaii 279, 554 P.2d 1137 (1976).
96. The calculation is thus identical to the one set forth supra note 58, except that, for the
party found liable only through res ipsa loquitur, the values are derived from an overall average
of the risk-burden ratio for that type of accident, rather than from the ratio of the risk and
burden of the specific misconduct of the party found negligent.
97. Most jurisdictions with comparative fault extend the doctrine to cases of strict liability.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 67, at 478. Recent decisions include Austin v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Day v. General Motors Corp., 345

N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); and Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex.
1984). Contra, e.g., Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 692 P.2d 24 (Nev. 1984) (rejecting use of

comparative fault in strict liability cases); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974) (same); see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 67, at 478 n.93 (citing cases). See
generally Woods, Products Liability: Is Comparative Fault Winning the Day?, 36 ARK. L.
REv. 360 (1982); Note, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We
Stand? Where Do We Go?, 29 VILL. L. REv. 695 (1983-84). For a discussion of the arguments
for and against comparing fault in strict liability cases, see infra text accompanying notes 16097.
98. Twerski, supra note 43, at 806.
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cannot receive any better instructions than to "close your eyes and do it,"
perhaps comparative fault should not apply in strict liability cases. The legal
system already contains enough arbitrary decisionmaking. 99
Indeed, the supposed conceptual difficulty of comparing fault in a strict

liability action constitutes the most often-raised argument against the use of
comparative fault in strict liability cases.100 Since strict liability imposes
liability without regard to defendant's "fault,"101 it is said to be logically
"impossible" to consider plaintiff's fault in a strict liability action. 02 According to one commentator, negligence and strict liability differ to such an
extent that "It]he concepts cannot be compared rationally."' 13
Courts and commentators have suggested various resolutions of this conceptual dilemma." 4 For example, courts have analogized strict liability to
negligence per se, treating the test for finding a product "defective" as if
it were a standard of care drawn from a criminal statute. 0 5 But cases of
negligence per se typically involve conduct a jury might reasonably find
negligent."' 6 A finding of negligence per se simply reflects judicial respect
for a legislative'0 7 or administrative 08 codification of the community judgment about the tolerability of a certain type of behavior.' 9 By contrast,
strict liability assumes the non-negligent character of defendant's conduct.
99. See Thode, supra note 55, at 5 n.3 (criticizing "close your eyes" approach on the
grounds that "we should reject any system that cannot be defended rationally").
100. For additional arguments against considering plaintiff's conduct in strict liability cases,
see infra text accompanying notes 160-97.
101. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 434, 442; Note, supra note 14, at 1682.
102. Kalven, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, supra note 13, at 904; accord Dickerson, Products
Liability and the Disorderly Conduct of Words, 20 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 422, 423 (1977); see
Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1435 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal maritime law) (Politz, J.,
dissenting) (likening comparison of fault in strict liability action to "an attempt to measure
the amount of water in an empty glass"); see also Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339
F. Supp. 676, 683 (D.N.H. 1972); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 67, at 478; V. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 11, § 12.6, at 206. Professor Fischer calls this the "one serious difficulty" of
comparing fault in a strict liability action. Fischer, supra note 52, at 433-34.
103. Fischer, supra note 52, at 442 (footnote omitted).
104. See generally id. at 434-47; Note, supra note 14, at 1684-85.
105. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967);
Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 547, 582 P.2d 271, 278 (1978). See
also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 850 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (driving after dark
without headlights deemed negligent per se). The courts have carved out exceptions to the
negligence per se doctrine for conduct no reasonable jury could find negligent. See, e.g.,
Brotherton v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 192 Wash. 362, 73 P.2d 788 (1937) (not negligence per
se when headlights suddenly go out without warning); Reuille v. Bowers, 409 N.E.2d 1144
(Ind. 1980) (not negligence per se to drive on left when right lane blocked); Tedla v. Ellman,
280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939) (not negligence per se to violate traffic law when obedience
more dangerous). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965) (listing incapacity, ignorance, reasonable effort to comply, emergency, and danger of compliance as excuses
for conduct otherwise constituting negligence per se).
107. E.g., Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981).
108. E.g., Koll v. Manatt's Transp. Co., 253 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1977) (occupational safety
and health regulations).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 comment d, at 26 (1965); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2, § 36, at 222; Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943).
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Indeed, strict products liability cases ignore defendant's conduct as such and
focus on the defective nature of the product." 0 Analogizing strict liability
to negligence per se thus not only ignores the theoretical underpinnings of
the negligence per se concept, but also fails to provide any intelligible basis
for comparison in the most common of modern strict liability cases, those
alleging injuries caused by defective products."'
Other courts have found in "comparative causation" a solution to the
problem of conceptual incompatibility. 1 2 But without more, the concept of
comparing causation neither relates to any meaningful notion of "fault"
3
nor yields an intelligible basis for deriving relative fault percentages."
A final approach to the conceptual problem is simply to redefine the problem
out of existence by claiming that engaging in an abnormally dangerous
activity' 4 or selling a dangerously defective product' 5 does constitute a type
of "fault," thus providing an appropriate basis for comparison with plaintiff's fault."' Labels cannot substitute for analysis. Nevertheless, the redefinitional approach, carefully elaborated, does at least render intelligible the
notion of comparing "fault" in strict liability cases.
The basic premise for comparison requires recognition that "fault," in the
legal sense, does not mean moral obloquy, but rather constitutes departure
from a legally-mandated standard of conduct.' 7 Given that definition of
"fault," one may define "comparing fault" to mean a comparison of the
extent to which each party deviated from the legal standard applicable to
that particular party's conduct."' The same legal standards need not apply
'

110. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 97 N.J. 429, 449, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965) (seller of dangerously defective product liable despite
having exercised "all possible care" in preparation and sale of product).
111. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 441-47; Thode, supra note 55, at 4 n.2, 5; Note, supra
note 14, at 1684-85.
112. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159-61 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
law of Virgin Islands); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984). See
also Twerski, supra note 43, at 826-29.
113. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 441-47; Note, supra note 14, at 1684-85. See generally
supra text accompanying notes 65-88.

114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
116. See, e.g., Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 373-74, 551 P.2d 398, 406,
131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 86 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); UNn'. COMPARATIvE FAULT ACT § I
commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1985); Fleming, Foreword,supra note 17, at

270; Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29
MERCER L. REv. 373, 377 (1978). Some would argue that even those who "innocently"
manufacture a defective product deserve greater blame than do that product's users-however
negligent. See, e.g., Twerski, supra note 43, at 799-801; cf. American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589-90, 578 P.2d 899, 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 (1978)
(arguing that negligent defendants, because they have endangered others, are more blameworthy
than negligent plaintiffs, who may have endangered only themselves).
117. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 75, at 535; accord J. FLEMING, supra note 53, at
256.
118. See, e.g., Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 500-01 (Me. 1973); Pennington v. Norris, 96
C.L.R. 10 (Austl. 1956); J. FLEMING, supra note 53, at 256; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 98,
at 390.
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to both parties, as long as one can sensibly compare the extent of the
deviations.
1.

Abnormally Dangerous Activities

Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity presents the easier context
for comparing fault. Not only does this form of strict liability focus on a
particular type of conduct, but there is a fundamental similarity between a
judgment of negligence and one categorizing a particular activity as "abnormally dangerous." Negligence, as discussed above, is based on a comparison of the risk with the burden to avoid the risk." 9 Section 520 of the
Second Restatement of Torts lists six factors to consider in determining
whether to categorize an activity as "abnormally dangerous":
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.'1
One can include each of these factors within the negligence calculus.' 2, The
degree of risk, the gravity of the harm, and the value of the activity are all
factors in a determination of negligence.'2 Activities of common usage tend
to have either little danger or great value; otherwise, their usage would not
be so common. Similarly, an activity that, given its context, a community
considers of little danger or of great value, the community will probably
also consider in an "appropriate" place. 23 Finally, a requirement that reasonable care could not "eliminate" the risk is no more than a restatement
of the proposition that defendant has acted reasonably and yet an accident
has occurred. Consequently, all but one of the factors in finding an activity
abnormally dangerous, and thus proper for strict liability, are also factors
in determining negligence, and the remaining "factor" simply restates the
premise that plaintiff needs something more than a standard of "reasonable
care" to recover from defendant. 24 A judgment that strict liability is the
119. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.

120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
121. See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska

1978) (observing that the Restatement's factors "suggest a negligence standard").
122. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 15, § 6.2, at 122; supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
123. Cf. Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional
Balance, 57 B.U.L. REv. 462, 496 n.246, 497 (1977) (definition of "appropriate place" in first

amendment doctrine depends in part on value of that place for free speech purposes).
124. Restatement § 520(c) follows logically from-and adds nothing to-the premise that
plaintiff's theory is strict liability. If reasonable care could have "eliminated" the risk, rea-
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appropriate legal standard amounts to a conclusion that, for an entire category of conduct, the costs of carrying on that conduct in a particular place
outweigh its benefits. 125 Thus, upon close examination, the supposed "conceptual difficulty" of comparing strict liability with negligence vanishes, at
least in the context of ultrahazardous activities. To adapt the fault-quotient
approach to this context of strict liability, one need only instruct the jury
to compare the risks with the benefits of defendant's activity, taking into
account the costs to society of defendant's curtailing its activity or conducting
that activity in some other location.
2.

Defective Products

Because of its focus on a defendant's product rather than on defendant's
conduct, strict products liability cases present a more difficult problem for
comparing fault. Various commentators have suggested methods of comparing fault in strict products liability cases. For instance, a number of
writers, finding in comparative fault "a kind of homespun judgment that
plaintiff should have his verdict reduced" by an amount reflecting his share
of the fault, 26 have suggested that the jury abandon any attempt to assign
fault to a strictly liable manufacturer and concentrate on assessing the extent
to which plaintiff deviated from the standard of reasonable care. 27 The jury
could then derive plaintiff's percentage of fault by assigning her a number
on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being reasonable care and 10 representing
28
willful self-injury.
This is essentially the unmodified "fault-line" approach described previously,' 29 applied to only one party to the case. Not only does the use of
this approach here fall prey to the criticisms already noted, 30 but it presents
even graver problems here because of its limited application. If, in apportioning liability, one cannot take account of the defendant's fault, one must
sonable care could have prevented the accident. But a strict liability action assumes both that
defendant has acted reasonably and that an accident has occurred. Therefore, any strict liability
action necessarily proceeds on the assumption that reasonable conduct would not have sufficed
to "eliminate" the risk. Articulating that assumption only restates the obvious: that the theory
of plaintiff's action is strict liability. But see A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
EcoNoMIcs 117-18 (1983); Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
Professors Polinsky and Shavell would distinguish between activities whose risk can be reduced
through greater care and those activities whose risk can be reduced only through reduction in
the level of that activity. Such a distinction-whatever its usefulness-is perfectly consistent
with the argument that one can employ the same general risk-burden calculus in cases of strict
liability as one uses in negligence actions. See R. POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 15, at 47678; Shavell, supra, at 22 & n.27.
125. See R. POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 15, at 476-78.
126. Twerski, supra note 59, at 326.
127. See id.; Fischer, supra note 52, at 449-50.
128. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 608-09, 642 P.2d 624, 634-35 (1982) (citing
Pearson, supra note 44, at 348).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.

-.
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ignore the dangerousness of the defendant's product. But surely the manufacturer of a product whose dangers far outweigh its benefits deserves more
blame-and should suffer more liability-than should the maker of a product
for which the balance comes closer to equivalence.' Indeed, the exclusive
focus on plaintiff's conduct may produce perverse results: as the danger
posed by a product increases, the same conduct with regard to that product
becomes more and more unreasonable. 3 2 But unless jurors consider the fault
of the manufacturer, they will allocate larger shares of the fault to plaintiffs
injured by more dangerous products, thus assuring that manufacturers of
the most dangerous products will pay proportionately the least in damages.' 33
To avoid this conundrum, a system of comparative fault covering strict
liability should require a true comparison of fault between negligent plaintiffs
34
and strictly liable defendants. But because of the policies of strict liability,
courts should take exceeding care in instructing the jury as to what constitutes
"fault" on the part of the manufacturer of a defective product. In particular,
it would defeat the purpose of strict liability to permit the manufacturer of
a defective product, by introducing evidence of its reasonable care, to obtain
apportionment of a relatively small share of the fault.' Indeed, it is theoretically possible that, by introducing compelling evidence of reasonable
care, a manufacturer could obtain an allocation of no fault at all. 3 6 One
can only sympathize with the confusion of lay jurors told by the judge that,
while they may consider defendant's reasonable care, they must allocate
defendant some non-zero percentage of fault.
The Oregon Supreme Court has attempted to solve this problem by mod37
ifying the fault-line approach to apply to strict products liability cases.
Under the modification, the trial judge must instruct the jury to compare
plaintiff's conduct with that of a reasonable person, assigning plaintiff a
number on a scale of 0 to 10. The jury must then compare defendant's
131. [Ain automobile manufacturer putting out a car with a cracked brake cylinder may,
even in the absence of proof of negligence..., properly be held to a greater measure
of fault than another manufacturer producing a mechanical pencil with a defective
clasp that due care would have discovered.
UNIt. CoMPARATrvE FAULT ACT § 2 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1985); see
also Twerski, supra note 59, at 329 (noting that "a bad defect most probably stems from
serious fault").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
133. Exclusive focus on plaintiff's fault also makes it all-too-likely that victims of the most
dangerous products will be allocated more than 50% of the fault-fatal to recovery in well
over half the states with comparative fault. See generally Sobelsohn, supra note 14.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 166-97.
135. But see Wade, supra note 116, at 378 (suggesting relevance of "the nature of the
[manufacturer's] spot-checking" in "determining the respective percentages of fault" in strict
liability actions).
136. It seems quite probable that the manufacturer could at least persuade the jury to allocate
it less than 50% of the total fault-a result that, in many of the "modified" jurisdictions,
would have the same effect as an allocation of 0%. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 434, 441,
443, 450. See generally Sobelsohn, supra note 14.
137. Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982).
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product with a product that would not have been defective, assigning the

defective product a number on a scale of 0 to 10.138 As with the "faultline" approach discussed earlier, a9 the jury then adds the two numbers and,
by dividing each party's fault number into the total, determines each party's
percentage of fault.'14
Although the Oregon court's approach makes a great deal of sense, it
has some drawbacks. First, as to plaintiff, the Oregon approach, like the

basic fault-line approach, erroneously assigns a paramount and undeserved
position to one single factor-state of mind.' 4' Moreover, as to defendant,
the Oregon modification is simply unintelligible. Neither the "product"
equivalent of intentional misconduct nor what qualifies a defective product
for a "10" is intuitively obvious. Finally, the Oregon approach leaves no
room for considering a manufacturer's conduct aside from its bare manufacture and sale of the product. But surely a manufacturer proven to have
sloppy inspection practices deserves a greater share of fault than a manu42
facturer with excellent but unavoidably imperfect quality control.
The problem of comparing fault in strict products liability cases can be

resolved, but only by carefully considering the different types of products
liability actions. Easiest are the design-defect cases. 43 Whether a product

has a defective design generally turns on the extent to which the design's
risks outweigh its benefits."44 Such a calculation is identical to the calculation
employed to determine negligence; thus, one can easily adapt the fault45
quotient approach to design-defect cases.1

A more sophisticated analysis would divide design-defect cases into two
categories: first, cases in which a reasonable manufacturer could have fore138. Id. at 609 n.19, 642 P.2d at 635 n.19.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
140. Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 609 n.19, 642 P.2d 624, 635 n.19 (1982).
141. See Thode, supra note 55, at 11 (in comparing fault in products cases, the plaintiff's
percentage of fault "should not vary according to whether the plaintiff's conduct was intentional
or merely negligent"); cf. supra text accompanying notes 48-49 (discussing basic fault-line
approach). Professor Thode, although rejecting any consideration of state of mind, makes a
mistake similar to that of the proponents of the fault-line approach: Thode would place exclusive
emphasis on risk and ignore the burden required of the parties to avoid that risk. See Thode,
supra note 55, at 9. But see id. at 13 (arguing that "plaintiff should be entitled to establish
an excuse . . . for the knowing use of a defective product").

142. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 116, at 378. See also Thode, supra note 55, at 12-13 (factfinder
should disregard fault of plaintiff who proves manufacturer negligent). This is not to say that
a manufacturer should have the right to open up the issue of its reasonable care in an attempt
to reduce its percentage of fault; rather, the option of introducing the issue of negligence should
belong solely to plaintiff. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text; infra note 150.
143. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978). As used in this article, the category "design defects" includes cases of inadequate
instructions or warnings. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 449, 479 A.2d 374, 385
(1984).
144. The California Supreme Court calls this a design's "excessive preventable danger." See
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236
(1978).
145. With "PD x Lo" as the risk and "BD" as the benefits of the allegedly defective design,
one can revise the formula set forth supra note 58 as follows ("A" is the accident victim):
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seen the dangers of the product design,'"6 and, second, cases in which the
dangers became knowable only after the product was on the market. 47 The
cases in the first group are, essentially, negligence cases: 48 a product design

is defective when its risks outweigh its benefits; if those risks were foreseeable,

the manufacturer was negligent. 49 In what are essentially negligence cases,
there is no reason to focus on the product and thereby lose the advantage

of having the manufacturer's allocation of fault reflect such factors as the
company's awareness of the risk or greater expertise. By contrast, cases in
which the manufacturer incurs liability for a design whose dangers became
known only after marketing are true strict liability cases, in which a focus
on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct might well lead to a
finding of minimal or even no liability. In those cases, focus on the product
alone is appropriate.
In design-defect cases in which the parties dispute the issue of foreseeability, the court can effect the dichotomy between "negligence" design cases
and "strict liability" design cases through instructions to the jury. If the
manufacturer is found negligent, the jury should then proceed to compare
the parties' fault, focusing on each party's overall conduct. On the other
hand, if the jury finds the manufacturer not negligent but the product
PA

PERCENTAGE FAULT
OF
ACCIDENT VICTIM

x

LA

BA
PA

x LA
BA

P, x LD
B,,

In assessing the overall risks of a product design, the factfinder should consider the risks to
all foreseeable victims of that design. See Thode, supra note 55, at 12; cf. supra note 55
(discussing basic fault-quotient approach).
146. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978).
147. See Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277-78 (Mass. 1984); Elmore v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). Commentators have criticized decisions holding manufacturers liable
for product designs of whose dangers even a reasonable manufacturer would not have known
before the injury. See, e.g., V. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks
in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892, 901-05 (1983); Comment,
Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects,
71 GEo. L.J. 1635 (1983). Indeed, at least one court has retreated from a prior decision suggesting
the propriety of strict liability for dangers "knowable" only after sale of the product. See
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 452, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984) (restricting Beshada to
"the circumstances giving rise to its holding"). Such criticism seems misconceived. If only those
dangers a manufacturer could have foreseen are relevant to determining whether a product
design was defective, strict liability in design-defect cases is functionally equivalent to negligence.
See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. Thus, those who argue against holding manufacturers liable for "unknowable" design dangers are, in reality, simply arguing against imposition of strict liability in design-defect cases. See generally Page, Generic Product Risks:
The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 853, 877-82
(1983).
148. But cf. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978) (shifting burden of proof in design cases brought under theory of strict
liability); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 455-56, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984) (same).
149. See Wade, supra note 105, at 835, 836.
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defective anyway, then, in comparing the parties' fault, the jury should
focus, as to the manufacturer, solely on the defective product.

Some manufacturing-defect cases present little difficulty. These are cases
in which plaintiff has some specific evidence of negligence in the defective
product's manufacture (for example, negligent failure to inspect properly).
When the evidence in such a case persuades the jury of defendant's negligence, the case can be treated as a design-negligence case, with the jury
comparing the parties' overall conduct.

But in many cases of manufacturing defect, the plaintiff presents no
specific evidence of negligence, and the case goes to the jury on a theory

of strict liability.5 0 Because it would defeat the purpose of strict products
liability to require a jury to consider the reasonableness of the manufacturer's

conduct, in these cases the court should instruct the jury to focus on the
defective nature of the product.' 51 But although focusing on the product
allows an assessment of its defect's overall danger, a product focus makes
it impossible to assess either the level of precaution taken by the manufacturer
or the cost of any precautions not taken. Indeed, to the extent strict liability

in manufacturing-defect cases differs at all from negligence, the difference
consists at least partly in the irrelevance, under strict liability, of the cost
to the manufacturer of avoiding the accident. 52 Consequently, if fault cannot
be allocated without considering each party's cost of avoiding the accident,
it will be difficult to derive a fault quotient for the producer of a defectively
manufactured product.

To resolve this dilemma, however, requires only slight modification of
the fault-quotient approach. Most products, even when not defective, carry

a certain degree of danger to life and limb. '5 In manufacturing-defect cases,
then, instead of comparing the risk of injury to the cost of avoiding that
injury, one may compare the risk of injury from a defectively manufactured

150. For reasons already discussed, see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text, the
plaintiff should have the right, by not raising the issue of the manufacturer's negligence, to
prevent introduction of evidence of the manufacturer's reasonable care. Cf. Elmore v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) ("It is a plaintiff's prerogative to
choose the theory upon which he will submit his case.
); see id. at 438 (manufacturer's
reasonableness not relevant to strict liability).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
152. This has sparked much of the criticism of strict liability. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 15, § 6.10, at 139.
153. Cf. Fleming, Report, supra note 17, at 1474 (discussing concept of "enterprise risk" in
German accident law). For example, although over 50,000 deaths occur annually on our
highways, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 78 (104th ed.) (Table No. 109) (reporting 53,200 auto accident
deaths in 1980), no one suggests that most of these accidents result from defectively manufactured automobiles; automobiles simply present grave dangers even when perfectly manufactured. See also Note, Handguns and ProductsLiability, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1912 (1984) (arguing
against imposition of strict liability on manufacturers of products perfectly manufactured but
whose norm is danger).
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product with the risks inherent in such a product without the defect. For
example, even a perfectly made power saw carries certain hazards. The fault
quotient for the manufacturer of a defective power saw would be the ratio
of the risks posed by the saw with the defect to the risks inherent in the
use of a power saw.' 5 4 To derive fault percentages in a manufacturing-defect
case, one need only use the fault-quotient formula, with "risks of a wellmade product" substituted, on the manufacturer's side of the comparison,
for "burden to avoid the injury."' 5 5 This approach should greatly ease the
comparison of fault-in manufacturing-defect cases.

II.

WHEN

Despite Justice Holmes's famous dictum,' 5 the law need not do "all that
it can." In particular, the feasibility of making a precise comparison of
fault, and of deriving percentages of fault from that comparison, does not
inexorably lead to application of a comparative fault principle to all tort
actions. Both the type of action' 7 and the type of injury suffered 58 may
affect the applicability of comparative fault.

154. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div., 292 Or. 590, 607-10, 642 P.2d 624, 633-35 (1982)
(manufacturer's fault in strict products liability case assessed by comparing defective product
with well-made product).
155. If one uses "PD x LD" to represent the overall risk of a defective product, and "Pw
x Lw" to represent the overall risk of a well-made product, one can revise the formula set
forth supra note 58 as follows ("A" is the accident victim):
PA x LA

PERCENTAGE FAULT
OF
ACCIDENT VICTIM

BA
PAX L
BA

Px
P,

L,
x L.

One might object to this formula as resulting in a greater allocation of fault to the manufacturer
of a product with few inherent dangers than to the manufacturer of an inherently dangerous
product such as an automobile. There are several responses to such an objection. First, consideration of the seriousness of the likely injury might well render the manufacturer of a
defective automobile far more at fault than the manufacturer of, for example, a defective beer
bottle. Second, even a well-manufactured beer bottle carries potential for danger. Indeed, most
products can be made dangerous by the right (or wrong) kind of use after their sale-even a
chair can collapse if abused by its owner. Finally, products that carry extreme danger even
when well-made, such as automobiles, generally induce an extreme degree of caution in their
users, which itself reduces the risk of injury. By contrast, the manufacturer of a defective
product that is normally risk-free has violated the consumer's safety expectations to a greater
degree than has the manufacturer of a defective automobile, and thus deserves a greater degree
of blame. See generally Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1370 (1974)
(arguing that products liability cases should focus on seller's portrayal of product to consuming
public).
156. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) ("the law does all that is needed when it
does all that it can").
157. See infra text accompanying notes 159-213.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 214-38.
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Type of Action

An action based on negligence is the paradigm case for application of comparative fault principles. Indeed, many works on comparative fault use the
term "comparative negligence," even while approving application of comparative fault principles outside the negligence area.'"
1. Strict Liability
The extension of comparative fault to actions based on strict liability has
generated the most controversy. Although the vast majority of states' ° and
commentators' 6' have approved such an extension, there are cogent arguments
against comparing fault in strict liability actions.
The most frequently raised argument against comparing fault in strict
liability cases is that one cannot, in any rational way, compare negligent
behavior with conduct triggering strict liability. 62 If there is no rational way
to compare the two types of conduct, any jury allocation of fault in strict
liability cases is necessarily arbitrary. 63 This argument, however, is refuted
by the fault-quotient approach, 64 a principled method of "comparing" negligence with strict liability and of deriving fault percentages in strict liability
cases. Thus, whether plaintiff's conduct should reduce her recovery in a
strict liability action ultimately rests not -on supposed "conceptual" difficulties, but on questions of public policy. 6 Resolving these questions requires
discussion of the major substantive justifications for strict liability.
One of those justifications is a manufacturer's ability to insure against
accidents and to spread the cost among the public as part of the price of
its products. 66 To the extent that it diminishes plaintiff's recovery, com159. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 12.6, at 200 (strict liability); Note, supra
note 14, at 1682 ("willful and wanton misconduct"). On the distinction between "comparative
fault" and "comparative negligence," see Pardieck, The Impact of Comparative Fault in
Indiana, 17 IND. L. REV. 925, 927 (1984); Comment, The Role of Recklessness in American
Systems of Comparative Fault, 43 01O Sr. L.J. 399, 399 n.1 (1982).
160. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 112-14, 454 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1983)
(citing cases): supra note 97.
161. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 432 & n. 11; Note, Comparative Negligence and Strict
Products Liability, 1978 ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 577, 579 & n.12.
162. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
163. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 756, 575 P.2d 1162, 1181, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 399 (1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting); Epstein, supra note 30, at 109; H. Levine,
Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault,
14 SAN DIEoO L. REV. 337, 356 (1977) (comparative fault in strict liability action places
"impossible demand" on jury).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 114-55.
165. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 387 (1978); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Hawaii 447, 461, 654 P.2d 343,
352 (1982); Fleming, Report, supra note 17, at 1474.
166. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See generally 0. CALABRESI, TiH CosTs oF AccmENrs 50-51
(1970); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 98, at 692-93.
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parative fault obviously impairs this loss-spreading function. 67 Responding
to this argument, one commentator has wondered why it is "desirable to

transfer to the other users of the product-all innocent-the cost of that
part of plaintiff's injury that is attributable to his own fault.'

' 68

The answer

is that such transference is desirable for the same reason spreading the loss
is desirable when plaintiff has not been negligent. 169 "Those who suffer
1 7
injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences,

regardless of whether they suffered that injury in part from their own
carelessness. The superior ability of manufacturers to predict and insure
against accidental injuries caused by defects in their products does not
fluctuate depending upon the degree of fault one can ascribe to persons
injured by those products. Consumers generally do not plan on being
7
careless. '
A second important policy behind strict liability is accident avoidance, or

"deterrence." ' "It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of
products having defects that are a menace to the public," '

defects against

which consumers typically "are powerless to protect themselves.' 1 74 By reducing the liability of a defective product's manufacturer in cases in which
plaintiff has been negligent, comparative fault will reduce that manufacturer's
75
incentive to produce a safe product.
The California Supreme Court, in holding comparative fault applicable
to strict liability actions, considered this argument to have "more shadow
than substance," finding that comparative fault would result in "no substantial or significant impairment of the safety incentives" of manufacturers.176 The court reasoned that, even with comparative fault, manufacturers

167. See O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault, with
Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591,
594-96; V. ScHwARa-z, supra note 11, § 12.6, at 206 (calling this a "fundamental argument
against" comparing fault in strict liability actions).
168. Wade, supra note 116, at 379.
169. See O'Connell, supra note 167, at 595-96.
170. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
171. A small exception must be conceded for those users so prone to accidents that they
can more precisely predict their own chance of injury than could the manufacturer. But most
accidents are not caused by such accident-prone persons. See G. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at
715 & sources cited n.80; see also A. POLINSKY, supra note 124, at 102 (noting that consumers
who underestimate the risk of accident may not insure against that risk).
172. See generally G. CALABREsI, supra note 166, at 68-75; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
2, § 98, at 693.
173. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor,
J.,concurring).
174. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
175. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 764, 575 P.2d 1162, 1186, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 404 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Twerski, supra note 43, at 801-02.
176. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737-38, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 387 (1978). For a discussion of the impact of the Daly decision, see Woods, supra
note 97, at 362-64.
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would still incur liability for defective products; that "a manufacturer, in a
particular case, cannot assume that the user of a defective product upon
whom an injury is visited will be blameworthy"; and that, without its merger
into comparative fault, the doctrine of assumption of the risk would encourage manufacturers to produce obviously defective 77products, which would
cause a manufacturer's incentives to be "inverted."'
But the California court's argument collapses under close examination.
No doubt manufacturers will still incur some liability under comparative
fault, just as they incurred liability for negligence before the adoption of
strict liability.178 But comparative fault will clearly reduce that liability, and
thus-to the extent of the reduction-reduce the manufacturer's incentive
to produce a safe product. 79 Of course, no one in any given case can predict
whether a particular consumer will be negligent, but the incentives of strict
liability do not operate on a case-by-case basis; they operate on the aggregate
of cases resulting from the manufacture of a defective product. For example,
suppose a product results in accidents costing about $1 million. To redesign
the product would cost about $900,000. Imposing the full costs of the
accidents on the manufacturer will cause the manufacturer, as a matter of
economics, to redesign the product, thus netting the manufacturer and society
a savings of $100,000. But the manufacturer can predict that, over the long
run, a certain percentage of consumers will negligently contribute to their
own injuries while using the product.'8 0 With comparative fault in effect,
this consumer negligence will reduce the manufacturer's liability, perhaps to
less than $900,000. It will now be cheaper for the manufacturer to pay tort
claims than to redesign the product, and society will have lost the savings
that a redesigned product would have generated.
The court's argument concerning assumption of risk also has serious flaws.
First, the argument rests on the premise that, without adoption of comparative fault, assumption of risk would remain as a bar to recovery in strict
liability cases.' 8 But this assumes at least a partial answer to the question
of the proper role of plaintiff's misconduct in an action founded on strict
liability-the very question under consideration. 82 Moreover, there is nothing
177. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737-38, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
178. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
179. Twerski, supra note 43, at 802.
180. For example, the incidence of drunk driving in this country, see Taylor v. Superior
Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979), makes consumer negligence
an easy prediction for an automobile manufacturer.
181. This is true also of the argument that retaining the doctrine of assumption of the risk
instead of adopting comparative fault would require the drawing of "shadowy lines" and result
in a "tremendous amount of litigation." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11,
at §§ 12.5, at 201, & 12.6,
at 205; cf. Wade, supra note 116, at 387-88 (rejecting, on similar grounds, suggestion that only
when plaintiff has responsibility for product safety should plaintiff's contributory fault reduce
his or her recovery). See generally Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95
HARV. L. REV. 872 (1982).
182. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n, at 356 (1965)
(assumption of risk complete defense to strict liability) with Note, supra note 181 (arguing
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"inverted" in encouraging manufacturers to make the dangers of their prod-

ucts so obvious that consumers can consciously choose whether to encounter
those dangers; this allows risk-preferring consumers to "trade on their taste"4
for risk8 3 and, indeed, underlies every ruling of liability for failure to warn.'
The problems with the California Supreme Court's assumption of risk
argument raise probably the most widely held theory of why comparative

fault will not increase the incidence of injuries caused by defective products:
adoption of comparative fault will give product users the incentive to protect
themselves, since they will know that their own lack of care will reduce their
recovery should they suffer injury. This incentive should keep the number
of accidents to a minimum.18

against retention of the doctrine). Cf. O'Connell, supra note 167 (proposing general abolition
of defenses based on accident victim's conduct).
A similar mistake is made by those who argue that, because plaintiffs in products liability cases
commonly allege both negligence and strict liability, and because comparative fault will apply
to plaintiff's negligence action, it would be "anomalous" and cause confusion not to apply
comparative fault also to plaintiff's strict liability action. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine
& Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 424-28 (Tex. 1984); Smith & Wade, Fairness: A Comparative Analysis of the
Indiana and Uniform Comparative Fault Acts, 17 IND. L. REv. 969, 989 (1984); Wade, supra
note 116, at 379; Woods, Comparative Fault and ProductLiability in Indiana, 17 IND. L. REv.
999, 1024-26 (1984). See also Note, Use of the Comparative Negligence Doctrine in Warranty
Actions, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 787 (1984) (making same argument for applying comparative
fault in products liability actions for breach of implied warranty). This argument assumes that
comparative fault should apply to the products liability action for negligence. Cf. Thode, supra
note 55, at 13 (proposing that products liability plaintiff's negligence reduce her recovery only
in her action for strict liability but not when plaintiff has proven manufacturer negligent).
Moreover, strict products liability was originally proposed precisely because of the difficulties
of a negligence action. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). It undermines this rationale to limit plaintiff's recovery
in strict liability simply because recovery would also be limited under a negligence theory.
183. R. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 15, § 6.6, at 128; see Note, supra note
181, at 877-78. For criticism of the proposition that barring consumer recovery for injuries
caused by obvious defects allows consumers to express a preference for risk, see id. at 878-82.
184. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968).
185. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978); Analysis of Model Uniform Product Liability Act § Ill[A],
44 Fed. Reg. 62,735 (Dep't of Com. 1979); Epstein, supra note 30, at 103-07; Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643, 658 (1978); Fischer, supra note 52, at
433; Note, supra note 14, at 1686; cf. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (5th Cir.
1983) (admiralty case). A related argument is that failing to consider consumer negligence in
products liability cases "causes inefficiency because manufacturers must include in their cost
calculus those accident costs caused by negligent use even when such accidents could have been
avoided more cheaply by product users than by the product manufacturer." Smith & Wade, supra
note 182, at 989 (footnote omitted); cf. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1432 (5th Cir.
1983) (admiralty law). This argument has at least two major flaws. First, comparative fault
does not allow manufacturers to remove from their "cost calculus" accidents the consumer
could have more cheaply avoided-indeed, some commentators see this as a major weakness
of comparative fault (and a reason to retain the common law rule of contributory negligence).
See, e.g., R. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS, supra note 15, § 6.3, at 124; R. POSNER, TORT
LAW, supra note 15, at 337-38; Demsetz, supra note 15, at 27. The second problem with the
argument is that it assumes that comparative fault will induce consumer carefulness. See A.
POLINSKY, supra note 124, at 102. The soundness of this assumption is discussed below. See
infra text accompanying notes 186-93.
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Whether one takes this argument seriously depends on one's view of the
causes of human behavior in the face of the risk of personal injury-whether
one thinks it realistic to expect that a product user, faced with the prospect
of losing a limb or his life through carelessness, will carefully weigh the
additional risk of losing part of a money judgment should an accident
occur.' 86 Note that this risk-rests on multiple contingencies: that an accident
will occur; that the victim will suffer injuries serious enough to result in
financial loss requiring compensation; that the product will prove to have
been defective; 8 7 that the product's manufacturer will be both solvent and
subject to service of process; that the manufacturer's attorney will learn of
the victim's carelessness; and that, some years down the road, a jury will
consider that carelessness sufficiently serious to warrant substantial reduction
of plaintiff's recovery.'s8 Add to this the probability that the victim has firstparty insurance for her most pressing medical needs'8 9 and that she knows
next to nothing about tort law,' 9 and perhaps there is room for skepticism
that adoption of comparative fault will induce consumers to handle products
with care lest their recovery be reduced.' 9' If criminal law scholars recognize
the simple behavioral principle that punishment, to be effective, must be
both certain' 92 and reasonably swift,'93 then it is time for tort scholars to
acknowledge that principle as well.
In sum, the policies underlying strict liability do not support-and, in
fact, cut against-applying comparative fault to strict liability actions.' 94
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the final argument for extending comparative
fault to this class of cases rests on the principle of justice. Comparative
186. See O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurancefor Many Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal
and an "Economic" Analysis, 42 TENN. L. REv. 145, 153-54 (1974); O'Connell, supra note
167, at 593; G. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 710-12, 716-17.

187. Tort rules can affect a potential accident victim's safety incentives "only to the extent
that the potential victim can predict that his injury will occur in circumstances indicating the
tort liability of some other party." G. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 711.
188. These multiple contingencies distinguish the effect of adopting comparative fault from
the effect of lowering the speed limit to 55 miles per hour, an analogy raised in Epstein, supra
note 30, at 104. The behavioral effect of a change in the speed lawv-which is generally well
publicized and known to all motorists-rests on only one real contingency: the risk of being
caught.
189. See O'Connell, supra note 167, at 593.
190. See J.

O'CONNELL & W. WILSON, CAR INSURANCE AND CONSUMER DESIRES

12-13 (1969).

191. Cf. G. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 719 (noting that, after workers' compensation laws
abolished defense of contributory negligence, accident rate declined).
192. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 44 (1968).
193. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 192 and sources cited n.34

(1978).
194. Some commentators would reconcile the tension between comparative fault and the
policies underlying strict products liability by limiting the kind of negligent consumer conduct
the factfinder could consider in reducing a product plaintiff's recovery, See, e.g., Thode, supra
note 55, at 11 (factfinder should disregard plaintiff's negligent failure to discover the product's
defect); Twerski, supra note 43, at 817-18 (factfinder should consider only plaintiff's negligent
"misuse" of the product or her failure to maintain the product in proper repair). These
commentators fail to recognize that any consideration of plaintiff's fault in products liability
cases weakens the policies underlying strict products liability.
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fault is said to be the "fairest way" of dealing with plaintiff's negligence
in a products liability action. 95 As one commentator has put it, consumers
' 96
also have "certain basic obligations that should ... not be negated.'
Those who would reduce a negligent plaintiff's recovery in strict liability
cases in essence believe that negligent accident victims, at least in part,
deserve their misfortune, and therefore should be made to suffer for it.
Whether the importance of appeasing this retributive sentiment, against
someone who by definition may have endangered only himself, justifies
rendering accident victims destitute for want of compensation for their
issue of tort law and morality each individual must
injuries is a fundamental
97
decide for herself.1

2.

Intent and Recklessness

At the opposite extreme from strict liability lie cases in which defendant
has injured plaintiff intentionally or through recklessness. At common law,
a plaintiff's contributory fault had no effect on her recovery for intentional
or reckless misconduct.' 98 As Dean Prosser explained, common law courts
considered intentional or reckless misconduct "differ[ent] from negligence
not only in degree but in kind, and in the social condemnation attached to
it.,,lqq
Even with the adoption of comparative fault, courts have generally maintained the distinction between intentional torts and negligence and have
refused to apportion damages. 200 But many courts show no reluctance to
195. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 102, at 712; accord Butaud v. Suburban Marine
& Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast
Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 352 (Hawaii 1982); Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 326,
609 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1980) (Utter, C.J., dissenting); see Fleming, Report, supra note 17, at
1476; Twerski, supra note 59, at 326 ("equity and justice"). See also Note, supra note 181,
at 887 (compared to instrumental arguments, "principles of fairness may better explain the
continued vitality of the doctrine of assumption of risk in the products area").
196. Wade, supra note 116, at 388.
197. For general discussion of the role of retribution in tort law, see Blum & Kalven, The
Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi-AutoAccidents and GeneralDeterrence, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
239, 268-69 (1967); Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysisof Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 855 (1953);
Linden, Faulty No Fault:A Critiqueof the OntarioLaw Reform Commission Report on Motor
Vehicle Accident Compensation, 13 OSGOODE HAL L.J. 449, 456-58 (1975). For an argument
that fairness considerations do not justify retention of the defense of assumption of the risk
in products cases, see Note, supra note 181, at 887-90. This argument applies equally as well
to the doctrine of comparative fault.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 481, 482, 503 (1965); Note, supra note 14, at
1681.
199. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 65, at 462.
200. See, e.g., Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85, 142 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1977); Finnigan v.
Sandoval, 600 P.2d 123 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Stephan v. Lynch, 136 Vt. 226, 230, 388 A.2d
376, 379 (1978). But see Comeau v. Lucas, 90 A.D.2d 674, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1982) (comparing
fault in action for assault). See generally H. WooDs, supra note 11, § 7.1, at 46-47 (Supp.
1983); Dear & Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: DoctrinalBarriers and
Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLAA L. REV. 1 (1984); McNichols, Should Comparative
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diminish a negligent plaintiff's recovery from a reckless defendant under
comparative fault. 20' As Professor Fleming points out, the claim "that recklessness or willful misconduct is fault of a different kind rather than degree
was merely a rhetorical device which is no longer necessary to do justice in
this situation. ' 20 2 Under a system of comparative fault, juries can be trusted
lion's share of the blame to parties previously singled out as
to allocate the
"reckless"; 20 3 the common law rule has become "an overcure. "21 4
Under comparative fault, however, an airtight categorical distinction between
recklessness and intent no longer makes sense. Although, as a general matter,
those who commit intentional torts have a rather weak moral claim to have
their fault compared with that of their victims, 2 5 "in many intentional torts
the element of intention is severely attenuated." ' 201 A tort called "intentional"
may involve "simply a conflict between legitimate activities. ' 20 7 Our legal
system should not judge the landowner protecting his property 20 8 or the
surgeon operating reasonably but beyond her patient's express consent 2° 9 by
the same standards applicable to a person who deliberately spits in another's
face. 210 Moreover, intentional and reckless conduct differ principally in the
probability of injury; 21' it is therefore somewhat incongruous to draw a sharp
and inviolable line between the two for the purpose of apportioning damages.
Finally, if juries can be trusted to allocate most of the fault to a party guilty
of conduct deemed "reckless," ' 2 12 they can be trusted to do the same when
one of the parties has caused harm intentionally. Consequently, rather than
bar comparative fault in all cases of intentional tort, a comparative fault
Responsibility Ever Apply to Intentional Torts?, 37 OKLA. L. Rnv. 641 (1984); Note, supra
note 14, at 1680.
201. See, e.g, Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Okla. 1980);
Zavala v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, 178 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1981);
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-19, 114 N.W.2d 105, 111-14 (1962). Contra, e.g., Draney
v. Bachman, 139 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187
(Wyo. 1979). See generally Comment, supra note 159.
202. Fleming, Report, supra note 17, at 1478; accord Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17,
114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962) (finding that distinction "no longer fulfills a purpose in comparative
negligence").
203. Note, supra note 14, at 1682. See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 5.3, at 108 ("the
core of comparative negligence is full apportionment on the basis of fault").
204. Wade, What Should It Provide?,supra note 17, at 226 (quoting draft of commissioners'
comment to § I of Uniform Act).
205. Note, supra note 14, at 1681; see McNichols, supra note 200, at 681.
206. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 15, § 6.1, at 119; see McNichols, supra
note 200, at 689 (suggesting extension of comparative fault to cases of " 'technical battery' "
or "where defendant intends an invasion of plaintiff's interests but is incapable of appreciating
its wrongfulness or foreseeing its harmful consequences").
207. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 15,

§

6.1, at 120.

208. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971), discussed in McNichols, supra
note 200, at 695-96 (proposing application of comparative fault).
209. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
210. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 II1. 553 (1872).
211. See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 8, at 36.
212. See supra text accompanying note 203.
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system should at least permit the court,
in individual cases, to instruct the
21 3
jury to compare the parties' fault.
B.

Type of.Injury

Comparative fault principles typically apply to actions to recover damages
for personal injury. 14 But tort actions can involve other types of harm,
including economic2 5 or emotional harm. 216 Nevertheless, some comparative
fault statutes apply only to actions arising "from injury to persons or damage
to property, ' ' 21 7 a phrase courts might well construe as limited to "physical
218
harm .,
To the extent such statutes assure the inapplicability of comparative fault
principles to ordinary breach of contract actions, the limitation makes sense.
Contract negotiations provide an opportunity for parties to "bargain and
allocation,
allocate risks and duties"; 9 courts should hold the parties to that
220
regardless of foreseeable carelessness by the party damaged.
But there is no compelling reason to exclude other actions, more typically
sounding in tort, simply because plaintiff seeks recovery for economic harm
or emotional distress. For example, the Second Restatement of Torts expressly recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation, 22 and negligence

213. See McNichols, supra note 200, at 698 (proposing "case-by-case determinations" of
comparative fault, reducing recovery only of a plaintiff deemed more at fault than defendant);
cf. Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 200, at 39 (urging application of comparative fault principles
to cases of intentional nuisance). The Uniform Comparative Fault Act appears to adopt the
case-by-case approach. Although, by its terms, the Act does not apply to cases of intentional
tort, UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAuLT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1985) (definition of fault);
see id. commissioners' comment, at 41, the Act was drafted so as not to preclude a court, as
a matter of common law, from applying comparative fault to a case of intentional tort if the
court "determin[ed] that the general principle [of comparative fault] should apply." Id. See
generally Sobelsohn, The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, in 3 CompARATIrE NEGLIGENCE 1931 to -33 (1984).
214. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975) (automobile collision).
215. See, e.g., White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 361-62, 372 N.E.2d 315, 318-19, 401
N.Y.S.2d 474, 477-78 (1977) (negligent misrepresentation).
216. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
217. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (Supp. 1984); accord, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-4-33l(l)(a) (Supp. 1984) ("injury or death to person or harm to property"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604.01 subd. 1 (Supp. 1985) ("death or ... injury to person or property").
218. See UNrF. CO mPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp.
1985).
219. Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 1983).
220. See Peterson v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982). But see Chamberlain v. Bissell Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067, 1083-84 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (contributory negligence
of employee reduces recovery for employer's negligent evaluation). Certain misconduct by a
contracting party, however-such as failure to render cooperation necessary to performance of
the contract-might well suffice to release defendant from her obligations under the original
contract. See A. CoRIN, CoRBN ON CONTRACTS § 1233, at 984 (one vol. ed. 1952).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
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has played a major part in the action for defamation for more than ten
years. 222 According to the Restatement, plaintiff's negligent reliance totally
bars recovery for negligent misrepresentation, 22a but it seems as logical here
as elsewhere to replace the total bar rule with comparative fault principles.2
It also makes sense to reduce the recovery of a defamation plaintiff who
fails to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to prevent the publication
of a false and defamatory statement about her.22s
Even more appropriate is the application of comparative fault to actions
in which plaintiff seeks recovery for emotional distress. 22 6 Yet it is far from
clear that a comparative fault law limited to actions based on "physical
harm ' 227 would cover such cases. Although many jurisdictions require that,
in order to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff

suffer at least some physical "manifestation" of that distress,2 8 some states
do not require the symptoms to rise to the level of physical "harm," ' 29 and
a few courts have done away with the physical-manifestation requirement
altogether. 230 Perhaps it would suffice under such statutes if the distress
results from witnessing physical injury to someone else, 23' but not all actions

for emotional distress involve a victim other than plaintiff. 232 There is no
3
good reason to exclude these cases from the scope of comparative fault.2

222. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974);

§ 580B(c) (1977). See generally R.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
RELATED PROBLEMS 251-55

SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND

(1980); Franklin, What Does "Negligence" Mean in Defamation Cases?, 6 Comm./ENT. L.J.
259 (1984).

223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977).
224. But see id. comment b ("Precedents to date have not made this extension."); e.g.,

Carroll v. Gava, 98 Cal. App. 3d 892, 897, 159 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (1979).
225. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 comment c (1977) (not necessarily a
defense to prove plaintiff's "indifference to publications that defame him").

226. See generally Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence
Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTrNas L.J. 583 (1982).
227. See statutes cited supra note 217; supra note 218 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 555, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982).
229. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (1979) (requiring
"physical injury," defined as injury "capable of objective determination"); Melton v. Allen,
282 Or. 731, 736, 580 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1978) (requiring "physical injury or physical consequences").
230. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927-31, 616 P.2d 813, 81921, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-39 (1980); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433,
437 (Me. 1982).
231. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (mother's
emotional distress at seeing child killed by automobile); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398,
520 P.2d 758 (1974) (child seeing accidental death of step-grandmother).
232. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980) (emotional distress upon negligently being erroneously told spouse had syphilis;
physical consequences not required); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372
N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (emotional distress upon being erroneously told of mother's death; physical

consequences not required).
233. It also would seem consistent to apply comparative fault to actions for invasion of
privacy, but see Wade, What Should It Provide?, supra note 17, at 233 (questioning whether
phrase "injury to person or property" covers privacy action), or to recover for lost consortium,
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The same is true of the newly emerging cause of action for "wrongful
birth. ' 24 If the law is to grant recovery to parents who unexpectedly conceive
a child because of the negligence of a doctor23 5 or a contraceptive manufacturer, 236 it makes little sense to distinguish such actions from other negligence actions for purposes of determining the impact of plaintiffs'
contributory fault. Totally barring recovery seems as unfair here as elsewhere;

awarding full damages, however, would eliminate a significant deterrent to
consumer carelessness in one area in which consumers probably do consider
23 7
the financial consequences of their behavior before risking an accident.
Yet not every court may categorize a normal pregnancy as "physical harm." ' 5
Thus, comparative fault statutes limited to "physical harm" should be rewritten to clarify their applicability to cases of economic harm, emotional
distress, and wrongful birth.
III.

WHOSE

Deciding how and when to compare fault leaves unresolved one significant
and particularly difficult question: whose fault is to be compared? This
question is answered easily when an accident involves only two parties; an
answer becomes far more elusive in multiple-party situations. In particular,
when one or more of the relevant actors has not been joined to the lawsuit,
should the factfinder consider the fault of that unjoined tortfeasor? 2 9 Fur-

thermore, under what circumstances, if ever, should a factfinder, in allocating
fault, group two or more tortfeasors together as one party? 240
A.

Absent Tortfeasors

There are two basic approaches to the problem of the unjoined tortfeasor: 241 one can include the absent tortfeasor in the allocation of fault,
see Wilkins, supra note 59, at 692; cf. UNrm. ComPARATrvE FAULT ACT § 1 commissioners'
comment, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1985) (suggesting phrase "injury to person" does cover lost
consortium).
234. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 55, at 370-73; Kelley, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 919.
235. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Schroeder v. Perkel,
87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
236. See, e.g, J.P.M. v. Schmid Labs., Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (1981).
237. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 186-93 (suggesting low probability that prospect of
reduced tort recovery will deter consumer negligence).
238. Compare People v. Sargent, 86 Cal. App. 3d 148, 151-52, 150 Cal. Rptr. 113, 115-16
(1978) (pregnancy caused by rape and ending in abortion constitutes "great bodily injury"
under criminal sex-offense law) with 10A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDA OF INsURANCE LAW § 41A:10,
at 13 (R. Anderson & M. Rhodes 2d rev. ed. 1982) (normal pregnancy is not "bodily injury
or disease" within meaning of typical disability insurance policy).
239. See infra text accompanying notes 241-319.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 320-57.
241. See generally Eilbacher, Comparative Fault and the Nonparty Tortfeasor, 17 IND. L.
REv. 903 (1984); Fleming, Foreword,supra note 17, at 256-59; Comment, Torts: Comparative
Negligence and Absent Parties, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 692 (1979).
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comparing fault among all persons who legally caused the plaintiff's harm; 242
or one can ignore the absent tortfeasor, limiting comparison of fault to the
parties to the lawsuit. 24 Neither approach escapes difficulty.

1. Including the Unjoined Tortfeasor
Including unjoined parties in the fault comparison has some advantages.
First, one can conceptualize comparative negligence as based on the principle
that a plaintiff should generally recover full compensation, less only that
portion of plaintiff's damages corresponding to plaintiff's own actual percentage of the total fault. 244 But in order to ascertain the plaintiff's "actual"
or "true" percentage of fault, one must include, in the comparison, the
fault of all persons legally responsible for the accident. This was the rationale
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co. 245 Under Wisconsin's comparative fault statute, an injured party's recovery "shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.' '246 The court interpreted this language
to require that a negligent plaintiff's recovery be reduced only by the actual
proportion of fault attributable to the plaintiff; it reasoned that the plaintiff's
actual portion of fault equalled 100% of the total fault less "the causal
negligence of all of the other participants in the transaction," joined or
7
not.

24

Allocating the fault (at least initially) over all responsible parties has a
second possible advantage: a jury may have difficulty apportioning fault
242. Many states use this approach. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 589 n.2, 578 P.2d 899, 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 n.2 (1978); Brown v.
Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 207, 580 P.2d 867, 876 (1978); Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 902-03
(Minn. 1978); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 159, 646 P.2d 579,
586 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc.,
624 P.2d 68, 69-70 (Okla. 1980); Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613, 621 (W. Va. 1981);
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 534-36, 252 N.W. 721, 727-28 (1934);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1191-92 (Wyo. 1981). See generally
C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, supra note 17, § 8.100, at 14 (claiming an "accepted practice to
include all tortfeasors in the apportionment question").
243. Several states and two model statutes take this approach. See, e.g., National Farmers
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1060-61 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); Kapchuck
v. Orlan, 332 So. 2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (Supp.
1985); MODEL UNn'. PROD. LLre. ACT § llI(B)(1)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,734-35 (Dep't of Com. 1979);
UNF. ComPARATIvE FAULT ACT § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985). See generally Smith & Wade,
supra note 182, at 979 & nn.56-57 (claiming "a majority of states . . . restrict fault comparison
to parties"). For a recent thorough review of the law on this issue in the several states, see
Little, Multiple Parties in 2 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 13.80 (1984).
244. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 25, 421 N.E.2d 886, 890-91 (1981); G. Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 724-27.
245. 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
246. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
247. 214 Wis. at 535, 252 N.W. at 727 (emphasis added); accord American Motorcycle Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589 n.2, 578 P.2d 899, 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189
n.2 (1978) (finding it "logically essential that the plaintiff's negligence be weighed against the
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while ignoring someone who obviously shares the blame for the accident. 248
As a result, including the unjoined tortfeasor may increase the accuracy of

249
As one
the percentage assigned to the plaintiff and joined defendants.

resembles
court put it, limiting the jury's allocation of fault to joined parties
' 250
asking someone "to judge a forest by observing just one tree.
Finally, allocation of fault among all tortfeasors facilitates the bringing
of a subsequent action against the unjoined tortfeasor-either by plaintiff
on the original claim or by defendant for contribution. An original allocation
including the unjoined tortfeasor, because it may be binding on the parties
to the original action, 21' fixes the maximum amount of recovery in the
subsequent action. This should encourage settlement, by setting the maximum

value of the claim. Moreover, allocating fault to all responsible parties makes
clear precisely who should retain a subsequent right of action against the
unjoined tortfeasor. An original party should have a subsequent right of
action only to the extent that that original party has had to assume the

share of the unjoined tortfeasor. Thus, if the jurisdiction limits defendants'
liability to their own proportionate shares, 2

2

plaintiff should retain the

253
traditional common law right to sue joint tortfeasors in separate actions.
On the other hand, if the jurisdiction retains joint-and-several liability despite
the adoption of comparative fault, 254 only a defendant who pays an unidentified portion of the unjoined tortfeasor's share should have the right to
obtain contribution from the unjoined tortfeasor;2" plaintiff's claim should
be extinguished. Finally, if the jurisdiction reallocates the shares of unjoined

combined total of all other causative negligence"); Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70
(Okla. 1980); Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1189 (Wyo. 1981)
(determining unjoined party's proportionate fault is "necessary for a total negligence picture").
See generally C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, supra note 17, § 8.100, at 14 (impossible to achieve
"true apportionment" without allocating fault to "all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence");
Eilbacher, supra note 241, at 905-06 n.2.
248.- But see Wash. Sen. Select Comm. on Tort Reform &Prod.Liab., 2 Hearing Transcripts,
Dec. 29, 1979, at 34 (testimony of Victor Schwartz, U.S. Commerce Dep't Task Force on
Prod. Liab.) ("juries ... don't like to apportion blame to people who are not there") [hereinafter cited as 2 Hearing Transcripts].
249. See National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1059
(Colo. 1983) (en banc).
250. Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980); accord Bowman v. Barnes,
282 S.E.2d 613, 620 (W. Va. 1981) (noting, however, that "factual development may well lack
the vigor and clarity which would be present if the absent party were actually in the litigation").
251. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
252. See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 203, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978).
253. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 47, at 327-28; G. WiLUAMs, supra note 30, §
111, at 421 n.l. But see Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 707,
715 (D. Kan. 1977) (Kansas law) (plaintiff who failed to join potentially liable third party, in
order to maintain federal diversity jurisdiction, held to "forfeit any right of recovery" against
third party).
254. See, e.g., Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 432 (Alaska 1979); Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321, 331-32, 227 N.W.2d 444, 449 (1975).
255. See generally Note, Reconciling Comparative Negligence, Contribution, and Joint and
Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1159 (1977).
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parties among the parties to the original action, 256 both plaintiff and the
original defendants should retain rights of action against the unjoined tortfeasor.
Determining who has assumed the share of the unjoined tortfeasor, and
thus who should retain a subsequent cause of action, becomes far more
complex if the finder of fact in the original lawsuit ignored the unjoined
party's fault. In such a case, one simply does not know to whom the
factfinder assigned the share of the unjoined party; it may have been allocated
to any one of the .riginally joined parties or divided among all of them.
This uncertainty may lead one to conclude that the original parties all deserve
the right to establish that they were the one forced to assume the unjoined
party's share, but then the possibility of separate actions against the unjoined
tortfeasor raises the risk of overlapping and unfair judgments. For example,
suppose plaintiff, whose damages total $10,000, brings suit against two of
three potential defendants (A and B). The original action results in an even
division of the fault (50% each) between the two defendants (A and B).
Both therefore pay plaintiff half of plaintiff's damages, or $5,000. But either
A or B-or both-may have assumed a portion of the share of the unjoined
tortfeasor (C). Both A and B should thus have a right of action against C.
Assume, then, that in separate actions both A and B are found equally at
fault with C. What do A and B recover? If each recovers $2,500 (half the
sum each paid plaintiff), 257 then each will ultimately have paid $2,500, while
C will have paid a total of $5,000-even though they were all equally at
fault. Giving C the right to join all parties to the action for contribution is
one possible solution, but C may be unable to effect such joinder, and it
is not clear that a court would find all parties to the contribution action
"indispensable. ' 2518 Allocating fault in the original action to all tortfeasors
obviates this difficulty by making it clear which of the joined parties has
been compelled to assume the unjoined party's share.
2.

Excluding the Unjoined Tortfeasor

Despite these considerations, many states, as well as the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, limit fault
allocation to the parties joined to the action.2 5 9 Courts and legislatures in
256. See infra text accompanying notes 315-19.
257. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 5 commissioners' comment, illustration 10, 12 U.L.A.
48 (Supp. 1985).
258. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271 (1983) joint tortfeasors
not indispensable parties, despite risks of multiple litigation or inconsistent relief). See generally
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, Local No. 68, 254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920) ("There
is no prescribed formula for determining in every case whether a person ... is an indispensable
party").
259. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. See also G. WILLAIS, supra note 30, § 110,
at 416-17.
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these states, as well as the drafters of the Uniform Acts, give several reasons
for their position. First, far from agreeing that accurate fault allocation
requires including the absent tortfeasor, they claim that the finder of fact
would have difficulty including a nonparty in the apportionment of fault.
As the drafters of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act put it, with a nonparty
"[i]t
cannot be told with certainty whether that person was actually at fault
,260
or what amount of fault should be attributed to him ....
But tort law does not require proof to a "certainty"; the typical standard
is preponderance of the evidence. 2 1 Perhaps those who would have the
factfinder ignore the unjoined tortfeasor assume that even the "preponderance" standard is unattainable as to the fault of an unknown or unlocatable
individual, and that only anonymity or disappearance will prevent joinder
of potentially liable tortfeasors. 262 However, one can raise serious doubts
about both of these assumptions. Although a tortfeasor's unavailability does
make it difficult to determine the nature of her conduct, 263 it is not impossible.
One can infer negligence without having any explanation or precise description of a negligent party's actions. 264 Indeed, inferences of negligence from
265
circumstantial evidence form the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Thus, for example, in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 266 a
car in front of plaintiff's car, after signalling a turn, turned into and then
suddenly pulled out of a service station, causing plaintiff and defendantwhose truck was behind plaintiff's car-to slam on their brakes. The sudden
braking caused defendant's truck to skid into plaintiff's car. 267 Despite the
absence-and apparent anonymity-of the driver of the lead car, 26 the jury
had no trouble apportioning negligence to that driver, and the court approved
269
the jury's apportionment.
But inferring negligence under res ipsa loquitur is distinguishable from

260. UNw. COMPARATrVE FAULT ACT § 2 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
1985); see G. WImmaMs, supra note 30, § 110, at 417 ("apportioning degrees of blame is
troublesome enough in any case, but it is likely to be doubly difficult if the court is required
to allot a portion of the responsibility to a party who is not present").
261. See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 90, 138 A.2d 713, 717 (1958). See generally PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 2, § 38, at 239.
262. The paradigm would be the hit-and-run driver. E.g., Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding
Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794
(1982); Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 41 Wis. 2d 661, 663, 165 N.W.2d

162, 163 (1969) ("the unknown driver of the red automobile").
263. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing evaluation of conduct in
determining relative fault).
264. Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613, 620 (W.Va. 1981) ("problems of proof" regarding
absent tortfeasors may be alleviated "through the other parties, or independent witnesses").
265. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 39, at 243-44.
266. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
267. See id. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580.
268. See id. ("The driver of the lead car is unknown.").
269. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586; see also Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp.,
41 Wis. 2d 661, 165 N.W.2d 162 (1969).
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inferring the percentage of fault of an absent tortfeasor. First, use of res
ipsa loquitur, in a typical case, may provide the only means of obtaining
any compensation for an injured plaintiff. By contrast, inferring negligence
against an unjoined tortfeasor will increase plaintiff's recoverable damages
only if a joined, solvent tortfeasor is available to assume the unjoined party's
share. 270 Moreover, res ipsa loquitur involves only an inference of negligence
simpliciter; it is far harder to infer any particular percentage of fault without
having some specific evidence. 271 Finally, the possibility of "flushing out"
probative evidence by inferring negligence against a defendant in the absence
of that evidence-a separate justification for res ipsa loquitur 272-has no
application to the situation of the unjoined tortfeasor, whom an inference
of negligence cannot affect. 273 Consequently, it makes sense not to allocate
fault to a party who cannot be located.
However, failure to join a party does not necessarily mean that that party
cannot be located and made a subject of discovery.27 4 Tortfeasors might not
appear as parties for a number of reasons.275 They may be immune from
suit as a matter of substantive law. 276 They may be beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, or a party wishing to join them may be unable to do so
procedurally. Finally, the parties may have tactical 277 or personal reasons 278
for not joining a potential defendant. Once one makes the basic assumption

270. See, e.g., Ross v. Koberstein, 220 Wis. 73, 74-75, 264 N.W. 642 (1936) (defendant not

prejudiced by failure to allocate fault to unjoined tortfeasor, since defendant would be responsible for unjoined tortfeasor's share).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
272. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940); Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated,
I BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 6 (1951).
273. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 823, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr.

858, 872 (1975) (evaluation of relative fault "would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit
against the absent wrongdoer"); accord, e.g., National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1062 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
274. See 2 Hearing Transcripts, supra note 248, Dec. 29, 1979, at 34 (testimony of Victor
Schwartz, Chair of U.S. Dep't of Commerce Task Force on Prod. Liab.) (most states' procedural
codes "provide adequate resources to get evidence ... from non-party witnesses").
275. See generally G. WILAMS, supra note 30, § 110, at 414; James, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1162-64 (1941); Smith &
Wade, supra note 182, at 980-81; Note, Consequences of Proceeding Separately Against Concurrent Tortfeasors, 68 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1955).
276. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 131-35.
277. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271 (1983) (defendant's

access to particular experts causes plaintiff's dismissal of that defendant). Parties may also
escape joinder because they are "judgment-proof," because proving the case against them will
present great difficulty, or because joinder would destroy federal jurisdiction. See G. WLLIAMS,
supra note 30, § 110, at 414; Smith & Wade, supra note 182, at 981; Note, supra note 275,
at 697-98.
278. See, e.g., Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Ballinger, 312 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(unjoined tortfeasor was plaintiffs' daughter, who was driving her father's car in which her
mother was a passenger); Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978) (unjoined tortfeasor
was plaintiff's son, who was driving his father's car when it collided with defendant's vehicle).
One commentator has observed that membership in the same economic unit may make it
unprofitable for plaintiff to bring suit against a close relative. Eilbacher, supra note 241, at
913. Note, also, that a close personal relationship often coincides with a tort immunity. See,

19851

COMPARING FA UL T

that fault can be compared, 27 9 the difficulty of determining the proportionate
fault of, for example, an immune nonparty-witness does not appear insurmountable. Thus, even conceding the difficulty of allocating fault to an
unavailable witness, that difficulty suggests a distinction based on availability
for discovery, rather than on joinder as a party.
Those who would exclude nonparties from comparison of fault make a
second argument, based on principles of res judicata: because an allocation
of fault cannot bind a nonparty, 2 0 determining a nonparty's percentage of
fault is said to be "futile. ' 28 ' But this assessment assumes that determining
the nonparty's share of the fault serves no useful purpose unless res judicata
principles apply against the nonparty. Yet none of the rationales for allocating fault to the nonparty282 requires entry of a binding judgment against
that party. One can ascertain plaintiff's "actual" share of the fault, and
award plaintiff full compensation reduced only according to plaintiff's "actual" proportionate overall responsibility, without having to enter a binding
judgment against the absent tortfeasor. Nor does making the comparative
fault calculation easier for the factfinder require entry of a binding judgment
against the absent tortfeasor. Finally, it will clearly aid-though not resolvesubsequent litigation if fault percentages have been assigned to all parties
in the original action. Hence, the "futility" label seems unjustified, and the
argument from res judicata unavailing.
A third argument sometimes raised for excluding nonparties from the fault
comparison is that such an approach encourages joinder, on the theory that
"[the more parties joined ....

the smaller the percentage of fault allocated

to each of the other parties. '283 Encouraging joinder in the comparative
fault context is clearly a worthy goal. But it is not at all clear to what extent
ignoring the fault of nonparties adds to the incentives for joinder. First,
both sides have considerable incentive to join additional parties regardless
of the jurisdiction's approach to fault allocation. 284 Because certain discovery
devices are typically available only against parties, 25 joinder will usually
increase both sides' access to evidence. 2 6 Moreover, joinder gives plaintiff
e.g., Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 580 P.2d 876 (1976) (unjoined tortfeasor was plaintiff's
husband, immune from suit under interspousal immunity).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
280. See cases cited supra note 273. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29
(1982).
281. H. WOODS, supra note 11, § 22:5, at 417; Wade, Uniform Act, supra note 17, at 389;

see G. WLLiAms, supra note 30, § 110, at 417.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 244-58.
283. UNF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
1985); accord G. WnAIAms, supra note 30, § 110, at 416-17.
284. See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 47, at 327 n.25.

285. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 33 (written interrogatories); 34 (production of documents
and things; entry upon land); 35 (physical and mental examinations).
286. This factor may weigh more heavily for plaintiff than for defendant in certain classes
of cases. For example, in product liability cases, the joined defendants may well have an
ongoing business relationship with, and thus not need the aid of formal discovery devices to
obtain evidence from, the unjoined tortfeasor.
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an additional source for compensation and the joined defendants a guaranteed source for contribution. Finally, to the extent either side would have
the option of bringing a separate action against an unjoined tortfeasor,

joinder saves litigation expenses. It is thus doubtful that
additional incentives
28 7
for joinder would have more than marginal effect.
But there is reason to doubt that ignoring an absent party's fault will
even marginally increase the incentives for joinder. It will probably not

increase plaintiff's incentives. First, the claim of increased joinder incentive
is based on the assumption that increasing the number of parties will decrease

the fault percentages allocated to each of the already-joined parties. 288 But
this will not occur in any case in which the jury allocates a certain percentage
of fault to the plaintiff and a corresponding percentage to defendants as a
group.289 The addition of another party defendant in such a case would

reduce the percentages assigned to each of the already-joined defendants,
but would have no effect on plaintiff's percentage. Plaintiff would thus gain

nothing from joinder.
On the other hand, suppose joinder would, in fact, reduce plaintiff's share
and consequently increase plaintiff's recoverable damages. In most situations,
plaintiff could have secured the same result by suing defendants in separate
actions. 2e This tactic might, of course, hamper plaintiff's access to evidence
and increase litigation expenses, but these are costs of nonjoinder that arise
regardless of the approach taken to allocation of fault.2 9'
287. See Fleming, Foreword, supra note 17, at 256-57 (noting paucity of precedent on the
issue of unjoined tortfeasors, and speculating that cause is "that plaintiffs usually prefer to
sue all possible defendants in one proceeding or that the defendant(s) sued will [usually] bring
in any others in third-party proceedings").
288. See supra text accompanying note 283.
289. See Note, The Modification of Joint andSeveral Liability: Considerationof the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 288, 306 (1984). This seems especially likely in a
products liability case in which plaintiff is charged with product misuse and defendants are the
manufacturer and retailer charged with selling the same defective product. Cf. infra text
accompanying notes 320-57 (discussing treating two or more persons as a single party for
purposes of allocation of fault).

290. Joinder of concurrent tortfeasors "is not compelled, and each tortfeasor may be sued
severally, and held responsible for the damage caused, although other wrongdoers have contributed to it." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 47, at 327.
291. The claim that ignoring the unjoined tortfeasor increases plaintiff's incentives for joinder
is so dubious that one court concluded that it was "full comparison in the original suit" that
"encourages plaintiffs to join all potential tortfeasors in a single lawsuit." National Farmers
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1059-60 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). This
statement is correct in those jurisdictions without joint-and-several liability, see, e.g., Brown
v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978); in those jurisdictions, failure to join a party to
the original action will require filing a separate action against that party if plaintiff is ever to
recover that party's share of the damages. See Wilkins, supra note 59, at 705. But cf. Greenwood
v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 707, 715 (D. Kan. 1977) (failure to join
additional defendant in original action bars subsequent action by plaintiff). In that second
action, the percentages allocated in the original action-although they will not bind defendantmay well bind plaintiff. See Fleming, Foreword, supra note 17, at 258 n.77; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). This would enable the second defendant to fight to increase
plaintiff's share of the fault, but bar plaintiff from trying to decrease that share. See Eilbacher,
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Ignoring the absent tortfeasor will not only have no effect on plaintiff's
incentives for joinder; it may well diminish defendant's joinder incentives.
First, assuming joint-and-several liability,2 92 if fault were allocated to all
tortfeasors, collateral estoppel principles might well bind defendant, in a
subsequent contribution action, to the percentages allocated in the original
action. 293 Those same principles would leave the contribution defendantthe originally unjoined tortfeasor-free to argue for an increase in the original
defendant's percentage of fault. Only by joining a tortfeasor to the original
action can defendant avoid this result. Thus, allocating fault to all tortfeasors, in combination with joint-and-several liability, gives defendants a powerful incentive to join all potentially responsible parties in one action.
This incentive is lost by ignoring the absent tortfeasor. Because the unjoined tortfeasor's fault was disregarded in the original action, the percentages allocated in that action are irrelevant to a subsequent contribution
action: the relationship between the fault of plaintiff and one defendant has
no bearing on the relative fault of that defendant and any other defendant.
Thus, defendant risks far less from nonjoinder when the absent tortfeasor
is ignored than would be risked under the competing approach.
Finally, if joinder would in fact decrease plaintiff's share, ignoring the
absent tortfeasor may give the joined defendants substantial incentive to
resist joinder. Because, under joint-and-several liability, 295 defendants will
each be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages less only plaintiff's percentage
of the fault, defendants may want to focus on maximizing plaintiff's share
rather than on minimizing their own individual shares. If joinder will reduce
plaintiff's share, then each defendant will have an incentive to resist joinder
of additional defendants. 2 6 Consequently, the claim that ignoring the fault
of an absent tortfeasor will increase the incentives for joinder seems, at best,
speculative.
supra note 241, at 915-16 (noting that plaintiff "bears the risk" of any inconsistency). Only
by joining all tortfeasors in the original action can plaintiff avoid this problem.
292. Most states with comparative fault have retained the principle of joint-and-several
liability. See, e.g., Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 432 (Alaska 1979);
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 582, 578 P.2d 899, 901, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1978); Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321, 33132, 227 N.W.2d 444, 449 (1975). Contra Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98
N.M. 152, 157-59, 646 P.2d 579, 584-86 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794
(1982); Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 204, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
294. See id.
295. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
296. This incentive is intensified by the provision in some state laws for a right of contribution
even against parties not joined to the original action. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
4.22.040(1) (Supp. 1985). That right gives joined defendants the opportunity to reduce their
net liability by resisting joinder and subsequently bringing a separate action for contribution
to which plaintiff is not joined. For example, suppose A, a plaintiff with $20,000 in damages,
sues B, one of two defendants. Limiting fault to the parties before the court, the factfinder
allocates fault 40% to A and 60% to B. B pays 60% of A's damages ($12,000), then sues C,
the unjoined tortfeasor, for contribution. In the contribution action B and C are found equally
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One final argument, rarely articulated, does support excluding unjoined

tortfeasors from allocation of fault. Under the approach taken by the supreme courts of Wisconsin 297 and California, 291 fault is allocated to the
unjoined tortfeasor, and plaintiff can recover from any joined defendant
found liable 299 100% of plaintiff's damages, less only the percentage attrib-

utable to plaintiff's own fault. Consequently, the joined defendants must
assume the full shares of tortfeasors who cannot be found.
The fairness of this approach is not intuitively obvious. Under such a
system, a defendant found 2% negligent would have to pay a plaintiff found

1% negligent compensation for 99% of plaintiff's damages; plaintiff would
have to bear only 1% of the damages, while defendant might have no hope

of obtaining contribution for the 99%. Fault percentages so similar should
not lead to responsibility so disparate.
The California Supreme Court, in American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court,100 justified its approach as follows:
[I]nasmuch as a plaintiff's actual damages do not vary by virtue of the
particular defendants who happen to be before the court, we do not
think that the damages which a plaintiff may recover against defendants
who301are joint [sic] and severally liable should fluctuate in such a manner.
But the reference to joint-and-several liability is somewhat misleading. A
defendant held jointly and severally liable with another joined defendant
has a legal right, in most states, to seek contribution from that other
defendant. 0 2 The other defendant's identity and, probably, his or her location
are known. By contrast, it may be that no one knows the identity or
whereabouts of the unjoined tortfeasor. Moreover, the court cannot enter

at fault; the court may thus award B a contribution judgment for $6,000 (half of B's payment
to A). See UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT ACT § 5 commissioners' comment, illustration 10, 12
U.L.A. 48 (Supp. 1985). B and C have thus each paid $6,000. But had C been joined to, and
found equally negligent with B in, the original action (and had A's percentage relative to B's
been the same, that is, 40:60, or 2:3), the percentages would have been A, 25%; B, 37.5%;
and C, 37.5%. Each defendant would have ultimate responsibility for 37.5% of plaintiff's
damages, or $7,500. B thus has saved $1,500 (the difference between $6,000 and $7,500) by
not joining C in the original action.
297. See Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 534-36, 252 N.W. 721,
727-28 (1934).
298. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589 n.2, 578 P.2d
899, 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 n.2 (1978).
299. In Wisconsin, which has "modified" comparative negligence, plaintiff can recover only
from a defendant whose fault equals or exceeds the plaintiff's. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West 1983). See generally Sobelsohn, supra note 14.
300. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
301. Id. at 589 n.2, 578 P.2d at 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189 n.2. Accord Walker v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 536, 252 N.W. 721, 728 (1934) (comparative fault effects
no "change in the common-law rule that all tort-feasors who are liable at all are liable to the
injured person for the entire amount now recoverable by him").
302. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50.
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binding judgment against an unjoined party.3 °3 As a result, a joined defendant
cannot recover the unjoined tortfeasor's share of the damages without relitigating the factual issues in a separate action for contribution. And in that
separate action, collateral estoppel may well bind joined defendants (but not
the unjoined tortfeasor) to the percentages allocated in the original lawsuit;3 °4
indeed, the original defendant might even lose. Of course, defendants held
to joint-and-several liability always bear the risk that the other joined defendants will be judgment-proof and unable to pay contribution.30 5 But there is
an obvious difference between taking only the risk of an insolvent joint
tortfeasor, and bearing that risk in addition to the risk that the other
tortfeasor will never be found, the expense of retrying the lawsuit if the
other tortfeasor is found, and the chance that, even if the other tortfeasor
is found, he or she will be exculpated on retrial. Finally, requiring any party
to bear ultimate responsibility for the share of any other party violates the
principle of proportionate responsibility underlying comparative fault-the
principle that, as a matter of fairness, persons contributing to an injury
should pay neither more nor less than their proportionate share of the

damages. 0
Other states allocating fault among all responsible parties place the entire
burden regarding the absent tortfeasor on the plaintiff. For example, in
Brown v. Keill,1' a Kansas case, plaintiff's son was driving plaintiff's automobile when it collided with defendant's car. Plaintiff sued for property
damage; neither party joined plaintiff's son. Expressly disregarding the "literal import" of the Kansas comparative fault statute 08 in favor of what it
perceived to be the legislative intent,309 the Kansas Supreme Court found the
statute to compel apportionment of fault among "all parties to the occurrence," even those who "cannot be joined formally as a litigant. 310° Finding,
303. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 823, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872 (1975) (evaluation of relative fault "would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit
against the absent wrongdoer"); accord, e.g., National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1062 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
304. See National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1060
(Colo. 1983) (en banc). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
305. Indeed, until recently, contribution between joint tortfeasors was unavailable in most
states. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 337.
306. See Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1980).
307. 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
308. The Kansas comparative fault statute requires the factfinder to "determin[e] the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the parties" and, in awarding damages, to compare
plaintiff's fault "to the amount of the causal negligence attributed to all partiesagainst whom
...recovery is allowed." KA. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1983) (emphasis added).
309. 224 Kan. at 200, 580 P.2d at 872.
310. Id. at 207, 580 P.2d at 876; accord Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 286, 580 P.2d 876,
879 (1978) (court or jury should "determin[e] fault of all the parties responsible for causing
or contributing to the collision or occurrence"). On this point, the Kansas court agreed with

the California and Wisconsin courts. For an attempt to reconcile the Brown decision with the
Kansas statute, see Comment, Brown and Miles: At Last, An End to Ambiguity in the Kansas
Law of Comparative Negligence, 27 U. KAN. L. REv. 111 (1978).
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however, that the Kansas "legislature intended to equate recovery and duty
to pay to degree of fault," '' the court held the statute to abolish joint-andseveral liability in comparative fault cases, and thus to place on plaintiff
the entire burden of assuming the share of an unjoined tortfeasor. 312 As a
result, under the Kansas statute the "liability of each defendant now rests
upon proportionate fault ....
[T]he risk of an immune or judgment-proof
'
tort-feasor falls upon the plaintiff."313
But imposing the entire burden of the unjoined tortfeasor on the plaintiffthe Kansas approach-seems no fairer than imposing the entire burden on
defendants-the Wisconsin-California approach. 314 More in keeping with the
philosophy of proportionate responsibility would be to apportion the burden
of unjoined tortfeasors among the joined parties according to their relative
fault. A comparative fault system can accomplish this in two ways: either
initially allocating fault among all contributing tortfeasors, then reallocating,
among the joined parties, the fault of those tortfeasors not joined; 315 or
simply ignoring the unjoined tortfeasor altogether, on the assumption that
the factfinder will automatically reallocate that, portion of the responsibility
31 6
to the parties according to their relative fault.
Although it would seem more direct-and a better assurance of actual
implementation of the policy-to allocate fault to the unjoined tortfeasor
and then explicitly to reallocate that fault among the parties, 317 this approach
has a fatal flaw: if the fault percentage assigned to the absent tortfeasor is
to be proportionately divided among the parties, none of the parties will
have any incentive to minimize the absent tortfeasor's share.3"' Under such
circumstances, an adversarial system may have difficulty accurately establishing the fault of the unjoined tortfeasor. 3 9 Thus, one can justify ignoring

311. 224 Kan. at 203, 580 P.2d at 873-74; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1983).
312. 224 Kan. at 203, 580 P.2d at 874. The court saw "no compelling social policy which
requires the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss." Id.
313. Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 286, 580 P.2d 876, 879 (1978); accord Bartlett v. New
Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 155, 159, 646 P.2d 579, 582, 586 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Stannard v. Harris, 135 Vt. 544, 547, 380 A.2d
101, 103-04 (1977). See also IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5(b)(4) (Supp. 1984) (providing for entry of
verdict against "each" liable defendant "in the amount of the product of the multiplication
of each defendant's percentage of fault times the amount of damages").
314. Eilbacher, supra note 241, at 913; Wilkins, supra note 59, at 736-37.
315. See Fleming, Report, supra note 17, at 1493-94; Note, supra note 255, at 1174-75; cf.
UNIF. COMPARATivE FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985) (treatment of uncollectible
shares).
316. See G. WILLrAmS, supra note 30, § 110, at 416-17; cf. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
§ 6 commissioners' comment. 12 U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 1985) (discussing immune parties: "spreading
the immune party's obligation among all of the parties at fault" accomplished by "leaving the
immune party out of the action altogether").
317. See Fleming, Report, supra note 17, at 1493-94.
318. Smith & Wade, supra note 182, at 995-96.
319. The drafters of the Washington comparative fault law, WASH. RV.

CODE ANN.

§§

4.22.005-4.22.060 (Supp. 1985), gave essentially this explanation for their decision to require
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the fault of nonparties as the only practical means of accurately and fairly
distributing the share of an unjoined tortfeasor.

B.

Treating Two or More Partiesas One

Under certain circumstances, a court might want to instruct the jury to
consider two or more parties as one for the purpose of allocating fault. For
example, the Arizona comparative fault law provides that, "[iff equity re320
quires, the collective liability of some as a group constitutes a single share."
Commentators have suggested that such situations include those in which
common liability arises from a vicarious relationship, 32 such as masterservant 322 or vehicle driver-owner.323 Other relationships appropriate for treating two parties as one may include manufacturer-retailer 324 as well as "coowners of property, members of an unincorporated association, those en3 25
gaged in a joint enterprise and the like."

exclusion of the fault of a nonparty from the fault comparison. According to the senator who
chaired the committee that drafted the Washington statute,
[Tihe idea of having fault allocated to parties with no real interest in the lawsuit,
to 'empty chairs' in the lawsuit, was not the kind of thing that we wanted to have
in our trial system. The trial system is based on an adversarial concept where people with real interests to the litigation [sic] fight it out with one another and we
want to make sure that only real parties with real interest in the lawsuit are there
when the fault is allocated.
2 Hearing Transcripts,supra note 248, July 25, 1980, at 11 (comments of Senator Talmadge).
A witness before the committee elaborated:
[O]nce you permit an allocation of fault against somebody who is not in the action
and has no potential liabilty to the plaintiff ... you don't get a truly fair and
honest result in a lawsuit because the integrity of the tort system really depends
upon people with a stake in the outcome being present in the courtroom and fighting
for something real.
Id. June 27, 1980, at 22 (testimony of Ron Bland, President, Wash. St. Trial Lawyers Ass'n);
see also Washington Sen. Select Comm. on Tort Reform & Prod. Liab., 1 Hearing Transcripts,
Sept. 8, 1979, at 66 (same witness to same effect).
320. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.

§

12-2502-2 (Supp. 1984); cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

4.22.040(1) (Supp. 1985) ("two or more persons [may] be treated as a single person for purposes
of contribution"). See also MODEL U~n. PROD. LiAB. ACT § 11 1(B)(1)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,73435 (Dep't of Com. 1979); UNIF. COmPARATiVE FAULT ACT § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985);
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1955) § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 87 (1975) ("if equity
requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share").
321. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1955)

§2

commissioners' comment, 12

U.L.A. 87 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment h, at 341 (1979).
322. UN n. CONTRMUTION AMONG TORTsnPSORS ACT (1955) § 2 commissioners' comment, 12
U.L.A. 87 (1975).
323. UNn'. CoMPARTrvE FAULT ACT § 2 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
1985).
324. See id.; Epstein, supra note 30, at 113 & n.48.
325. UNF. CoNTrnsoN AMONG ToRTaAsoES ACT (1955)

§

2 commissioners' comment, 12

U.L.A. 87 (1975). Another example might be derivative actions, in which negligence by another
person is charged to plaintiff. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 912,
916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968) (child's contributory negligence bars recovery of mother suing
for emotional distress suffered upon seeing child killed in auto accident). See also G. WLiAms,
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The device of treating two parties as one arose when contribution was

awarded according to the parties' pro rata shares of plaintiff's damages.3 26
Under such a scheme, it makes a great deal of sense to combine the shares
of, for instance, an employer and employee; holding each liable for a full
share would amount, in effect, to charging the vicariously liable employer

for two full shares. However, this rationale collapses in a comparative fault
system, which can base contribution upon the parties' individual percentages
of fault. One would expect the jury, under such a system, to allocate 0%
of the fault to a party held liable only vicariously. 327 Indeed, if plaintiff has
introduced no evidence of a party's personal negligence, the court can instruct
the jury to return a finding of 0% for that party. 32 In any event, the court
would enter judgment against the party held vicariously liable for the sum
of that party's separate fault, if any, plus the fault of the party for whom
he or she was responsible. 329 Then, in a subsequent contribution action
brought by any other defendant, the vicariously liable party would have to
pay up to the combined share.
At first glance, it may seem that there is "no practical difference" between
treating two parties as one and allocating 0% of fault to one of the two
and imputing the fault of the second to him. 3 0 Yet treating two or more
parties as one has significant costs. First, a jury might have difficulty understanding instructions to treat, as one party, two different individuals. For
example, in Cartagena v. P & F Trucking, Inc., 31 the trial court told the
supra note 30, § 115, at 438 (discussing actions brought under survival statutes); id. at 444
(discussing assigned claims, such as those that pass to a trustee in bankruptcy).
326. See, e.g., Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938); Martindale v.
Griffin, 259 N.Y. 530, 182 N.E. 167 (1932); UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsORS ACT
(1955) §§ 1(b), 2(a) & (b), 12 U.L.A. 63, 87 (1975).
327. Comparing fault also resolves the problem of co-owned property or joint enterprises.
If each defendant has personally acted negligently, careful jury instructions on the proper
method of comparing fault should avoid any unfair allocation of fault on the fortuitous basis
of the number of tortfeasors involved in the accident. If, on the other hand, one or more
defendants are liable only vicariously, whichever defendant pays the common liability extinguishes the liability of the other defendants and can recover contribution according to the
defendants' respective personal shares of the fault (since each vicariously liable defendant was
found 0% at fault personally, this would amount to even division).
328. See Larsen v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 282 Minn. 135, 148-49, 163 N.W.2d 755, 764 (1968)
(judge should exclude, from fault comparison, party liable only vicariously).
329. In derivative tort actions, the court would add the plaintiff's personal negligence, if
any, to the share of fault allocated to the accident victim from whose injury or death plaintiff's
action derives, and enter judgment for plaintiff for the difference between the sum and 100%.
330. See Patino v. Grigg & Anderson Farms, 97 Idaho 251, 257, 542 P.2d 1170, 1176 (1975);
C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 75-76 (1936). For example,
a court, treating a vicariously liable employer as one party with his or her negligent employee,
should award the employer a right of indemnity against the employee. See G. WILLIAMs, supra
note 30, § 45, at 162. Were the jury to allocate fault separately to employer and employee,
presumably (absent some personal employer negligence, independent of the employee's) the
employer would be assigned 0% of the fault, and should have the right to 1000o contributionin effect, indemnity-from the employee. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282
N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391 (1972); see also Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32
N.Y.2d 553, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1973).
331. 73 A.D.2d 490, 426 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1980).
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jury to treat a worker and his employer as one party, whereupon the jury
returned a verdict assigning 20% of the fault to the plaintiff, 20% to the
employee, and 60% to the employer. 32
A second argument against treating two parties as one rests on the provision in many state statutes of a rigfit of contribution among joint tortfeasors.333 Such statutes seem to contemplate basing contribution, at least
among parties joined to plaintiff's action,33 4 on the same fault percentages
allocated for the purpose of determining plaintiff's recovery.33 But treating
two parties as one seems to rule out an allocation of fault, as between those
two parties, in plaintiff's original action. Without such allocation, a party
seeking contribution apparently will have to file-and try-a separate action,
even though the contribution defendant was joined to plaintiff's original
action.
Alternatively, a separate allocation could take place in plaintiff's action
between two parties otherwise treated as one.3 3 6 But this will confuse the
jury even more. Moreover, if the legal system can trust the jury to allocate
fault between two parties for purposes of contribution, one wonders why
3 7
the jury need treat these parties as one for any purpose.
A final argument against treating two parties as one rests on the language
in some state statutes governing the effect of a release. A recent North
Dakota case 338 illustrates this problem. Plaintiff had settled with an employee
but not with her employer. Under North Dakota law, "[i]f equity requires
the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share. ' 339
But state law also provides that a release "reduces the claim against the
[nonsettling tortfeasors] to the extent of the relative degree of fault (per-

332. The judgment was reversed for inconsistency in the verdict. Id. at 491-92, 426 N.Yk.S.2d
at 487.
333. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50.
334. Because an allocation of fault cannot bind a nonparty, a reallocation of fault must
take place in any contribution action against someone not joined to plaintiff's original action.
See supra text following note 294. See generally Note, A Separate Cause of Action for Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 49 Mo. L. REv. 121 (1984); Note, supra note 255.
335. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.040 (Supp. 1985). See also MODEL UNn'.
PROD. LIAB. ACT § 113(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,739 (Dep't of Com. 1979).
336. Cf. ARIZ. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2509(C) (Supp. 1984) (setting forth different criteria
for comparing fault between plaintiff and strictly liable defendants in plaintiff's action, and
among strictly liable defendants in action for contribution).
337. Glanville Williams argues that a vicariously liable employer should generally be treated
as one party with her neglient employee. See G. WILLiAMs, supra note 30, §§ 114-15, at 43132. But Professor Williams adds that if "the master is guilty of personal negligence, this
may be taken into account as an independent factor in the apportioning of loss." Id. § 144,
at 431 (footnote omitted); cf. id. § 45, at 165 (suggesting that an employee be awarded
contribution against an employer who "has contributed to the damage by his own fault").
Presumably Professor Williams contemplates instructing the jury to treat the employer and
employee as one only when the jury finds the employer free of personal fault, and not otherwise.
But it is far simpler and clearer for the jury to be told to treat the parties independently in
all cases, and for the court to effect imputation of fault to the employer.
338. Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984).
339. N.D. CET. CODE § 32-38-02(2) (1976).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:413

centage of negligence) attributable to the released joint tort-feasors."34° Con-

struing the two statutory sections together, the state supreme court found
that the servant's negligence constituted "the entire 'single share' of liability
attributable jointly to the master and servant," and thus plaintiff, by releasing the employee, had (perhaps unwittingly) released the employer as
342
well. 34' A decision like this is sure to discourage separate settlements;
343
moreover, it is seemingly inconsistent with the common statutory provision
(also the law in North Dakota) 344 that a release given to one tortfeasor does
not discharge other persons liable upon the same claim unless the release so
provides.345 Yet the decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court is completely consistent with the provision for treating two parties as one.
If the jurisdiction limits the allocation of fault to the parties before the
court, 346 treating two parties as one will make sense in only one situation:
when a defendant is vicariously liable for the fault of a nonparty. If the
comparative fault law forbids the allocation of fault to nonparties, the only
way to allocate any fault to a joined defendant vicariously liable for a
nonparty will be to treat the joined defendant and the unjoined tortfeasor
as one party. 347 Otherwise, only rarely-if 348
ever-should the court instruct
the jury to treat two persons as one party.

340. Id. § 32-38-04(1), as construed in Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 121
(N.D. 1979).

341. Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1984).
342. The North Dakota Supreme Court responded to this argument in two ways. First, the
court claimed that, in fact, its decision would encourage settlements, reasoning that, if "the
vicarious liability of [the employers] was not discharged by the release, the end result may be
that [the employee] would be liable to [the employers] for indemnity." Horejsi v. Anderson,
353 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1984). This liability for indemnity would obviously discourage the
employee from settling. See Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109, 114, 493
P.2d 625, 628 (1972); 44 TENN. L. Rav. 188, 198 (1976). The court also suggested that the
terms of the release, requiring piaintiff to reimburse the employee for any judgment for
indemnity, would produce a "circuitous procedure" under which, as soon as the employers
secured a contribution judgment against the employee, plaintiff would have to turn over to
the employee the amount of any judgment she had received from the employers. Horejsi, 353
N.W.2d at 319-20. Both of these arguments, of course, rest on the existence of an implied
right of indemnity between employers and employees. There are good reasons not to recognize
such a right, see, e.g., James, supra note 275, at 1169, especially after adoption of contribution
and comparative fault. See W. Keeton, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 27
INs. CouNs. J. 630, 631 (1960); Sobelsohn, supra note 213, at 19-109. In any event, the court's
argument does not apply outside the employment situation in any context in which there is no
right of indemnity.
343. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 48 (Supp.
1985).
344. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04(l) (1976).
345.' See Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (based on similar provision,
release given to hospital does not release hospital's putative agents), aff'd sub nom. Blackshear
v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (1978).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 317-19.
347. 0. WILLiAMs, supra note 30, § 110, at 418-19.
348. See id. § 115, at 442 (reporting that "[tihe tide has long been running against" treating
two or more parties as one).
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A final problem arises in strict products liability when plaintiff sues both
the manufacturer and at least one other member of the product-distribution
chain.3 49 If that other seller-for example, a retailer-has been negligent,
the case presents no real problem: the jury can fairly apportion fault to the
retailer based on its negligence, to the manufacturer based on its negligence
(or the product defect),350 and to the plaintiff. The court can then base a
contribution award on these percentages."' s A troublesome problem arises,
however, when the retailer has not been negligent but has incurred only
strict liability. In such a case, the jury-focusing on the product defect rather
than on any more general review of the retailer's conduct 352-will likely
allocate a similar percentage of fault to the retailer and manufacturer. As
a result, the manufacturer and retailer will probably end up sharing the
liability more or less equally. This seems unfair and inconsistent with the
policies underlying strict products liability. Surely the manufacturer, who
built the product and who presumably had the best opportunity to inspect
it, bears more of the responsibility and deserves more of the blame for a
defective product than does a retailer,35 3 who may have received and sold
the product in a sealed package. Moreover, the manufacturer is usually in
a far better position than any other member of the product-distribution chain
to absorb and spread the cost of an accident. 3 4 These considerations appear
to underlie the current movement to make the retailer's strict products
liability secondary, active only when the manufacturer is insolvent or cannot
be found;3a. they would also appear to provide the basis for the old common
law rule that even a negligent retailer can recover full indemnity from the
supplier of a defective product.3 56 The same considerations suggest making
the retailer's strict liability secondary-akin to vicarious liability-as a matter
of comparative fault and contribution. Thus, for the purposes of strict
products liability, a judge should treat a nonmanufacturer product-liability
defendant like an employer liable under respondeat superior: personally

349. Cf. Epstein, supra note 30, at 113 & n.48 (court should treat manufacturer and retailer
as one party for purposes of fault allocation).
350. See generally supra text accompanying notes 126-55.
351. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr.
550 (1978); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d
866 (1973). But see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 45, at 160 (arguing that, because of difficulty
of comparing fault in strict liability cases, a strictly liable tortfeasor should be awarded indemnity
against a negligent codefendant).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
353. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 434, 443.
354. See id. at 443. But see Jensvold, supra note 66, at 739 (noting that the manufacturer
is not always in the best position to spread the loss).
355. See, e.g., MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 105, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,726 (Dep't of Com. 1979);
Leete, ProductsLiabilityfor NonmanufacturerProduct Sellers: Is It Time to Draw the Line?, 17
FORUM 1250, 1264 (1982).
356. See REsTAmEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2)(d) (1979). See also Kerns v. Engelke,
54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 340, 369 N.E.2d 1284, 1297 (1977) (awarding indemnity from manufacturer
to strictly liable retailer).
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level of negligence,
allocated only so much fault as is justified by its own
57
and only derivatively liable for the product defect.
CONCLUSION

Adoption of comparative fault raises a number of difficult issues. In
particular, few if any comparative fault laws give guidance on how to
compare fault or how to derive percentages from such a comparison. Moreover, there is serious question whether-even if practicable-comparative
fault should apply at all to actions grounded in strict liability. Additional
particularly troubling issues include whether to allocate fault to unjoined
tortfeasors, and when, if ever, to treat two parties as one. Following the
suggestions set forth in this article will advance tort law toward a more
intelligible and justifiable approach to comparative fault.
357. But see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 45, at 160 (arguing that, because of difficulty
of comparing fault, strictly liable tortfeasors should divide damages equally).

